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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation I examine a set of crucial topics in the political economy of 
international trade, with an emphasis on firm-level heterogeneity. The first chapter is an 
empirical study of the new trade theories in which firm heterogeneity and trade costs play central 
roles in shaping the patterns of international trade. It examines the empirical basis for the 
theoretical insights offered by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (QJE 2008), HMR. A crucial 
element in this analysis is identifying a variable that affects the fixed costs of exporting from one 
country to another, but not the variable costs (“excluded variable”). We argue that the nature of 
the variable that HMR had selected for this purpose and some errors in the dataset weaken their 
empirical case for the theoretical observations. We propose an alternative “excluded variable” 
that addresses those concerns. It benefits from the existence of panel data contemporaneous with 
the trade data and it fulfills the empirical requirements for an excluded variable regardless of the 
model specification. The results confirm HMR’s finding that firm heterogeneity plays a 
significant role in the response of trade volumes to trade costs. However, the magnitude of 
selection and heterogeneity biases in trade elasticities caused by the absence of appropriate 
corrections are smaller than those presented in HMR. The option to use panel data opens up 
possibilities for further research on the role of country-level variables in shaping trade patterns. 
We examine two such variables—GDP and Rule of Law—and find that they have tangible 
effects on shaping trade, though not as strong as often found in traditional gravity regressions. 
Our study also casts doubt on the use of some bilateral indicators, such as common religion and 
language, proposed as alternative excluded variables. Instead, it points to other indicators that 
may be useful in the future studies of trade flows and related topics. 
The second chapter examines the determinants of formations of trade partnerships and 
bilateral flows in oil trade and how these factors ultimately affect the world prices and trade 
pattern. We use the approach developed by HMR to specify and estimate a model of bilateral oil 
trade controlling for the role of selection in partnership formation and source heterogeneity in the 
flow of oil among countries. The results show that ignoring these controls introduces significant 
biases in the estimation of the elasticities of oil trade with respect to its determinants. We employ 
the estimation results to analyze the role of various factors in the formation of partnerships and 
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bilateral flows in oil trade and examine how these factors affect the cost of oil for each country 
and their ultimate impact on world prices and trade pattern. We use the model to carry out a 
series of global equilibrium simulation exercises to demonstrate the usefulness of the model. In 
particular, we show that for the rise in oil prices during 1997-2007 to have been caused by 
economic growth around the world, the demand and supply price elasticities must have been 
closer to their short run estimates found in the literature. Moreover, relatively high growth in 
OECD countries followed by rapid growth in transition countries and India and China account 
for the bulk of the rise in global oil prices. We also show that the model can be used to explore 
various scenarios of oil price responses to international security issues, especially the conflicts of 
Iran with the West. 
Finally, the third chapter analyzes the bilateral trade patterns of oil substitutes around the 
world and how it links with the crude oil trade. We construct price and quantity indices for three 
forms of energy—natural gas, coal and electricity (GCE)—that are substitutes for each other and 
oil. In order to estimate a model of bilateral trade in GCE forms of energy we use the approach 
developed by HMR. We use the model to carry out a series of global equilibrium simulation 
exercises. We show that the rise in GCE prices during 1997-2007 may be explained by economic 
growth around the world, with an estimated long-run price elasticity of world supply of GCE 
which is around 0.60. Moreover, high growth in China and India followed by rapid growth in 
transition countries and OECD countries account for the bulk of the rise in global GCE prices. 
We also show that the model can be used to explore various scenarios of GCE price responses to 
international conflict issues. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Our work relates to the existing literature through a wide variety of topics. There are at 
least four general dimensions: (1) the gravity approach to analyze trade flows, (2) the impact of 
institutional factors on trade in a gravity framework, (3) the interaction of international conflict 
and trade, particularly oil trade, and (4) the link between crude oil prices and economic growth.  
1.1 Gravity Model of International Trade 
The gravity model has become a widely-used workhorse for studying the determinants of 
bilateral trade flows. The main result of the model, the gravity equation, relates trade between 
two countries to the levels of economic activity in those countries and to the inverse of trade 
costs factors such as distance. Despite being applied in a variety of contexts, its theoretical 
foundations have remained rather unclear. The first applications of the gravity equation in 
international trade appeared independently in Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963), both of 
which were purely empirical studies, not concerned about theory. The first formal attempt to 
provide micro-foundations for the gravity equation was Anderson (1979), who derived it directly 
from a theoretical model of differentiated products, with each variety being produced by only 
one country. Since then, many other models with very different structures have also been used to 
generate the trade equations of general gravity form (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Bergstrand, 
1985, 1989, and 1990; Markusen and Wigle, 1990; Eaton and Kortum, 1997; and Deardorff, 
1998). For surveys covering the literature until early 2000s, see Helpman (1998) and Evenett and 
Keller (2002).  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003 and 2004) introduced a new and elegant micro-
foundation for the gravity equations. One of their main contributions was to highlight the role of 
“multilateral resistance” terms that measure the overall effects of import and export costs for 
each country. They showed that exports from country j to country i depends on the price of j’s 
goods in i relative to the overall price index for all of j’s products and the overall price index for 
i’s purchases. The “multilateral resistance” terms may also be viewed as measures of 
“remoteness” of a country from its potential trade partners. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
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estimated a gravity model with “multilateral resistance” terms. However, since the calculations 
behind those terms are cumbersome, in recent empirical studies their effects have typically been 
captured via exporter and importer fixed effects. 
Explaining and taking account of the zero trade flows in the empirical applications of the 
gravity equation have been two other important concerns in the literature. One approach to deal 
with the problem has been to view actual trade as the outcome of gravity equation, augmented by 
a random factor that may yield zero trade when it is sufficiently low. Under this assumption, the 
Heckman selection method or a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator can be used for 
correcting the bias caused by the zero trade flows (see, for example, Anderson and Marcouiller, 
2002, and Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). A number of authors have pointed out that such 
corrections could be improved by considering non-random factors that may affect the formation 
of trade partnerships, in particular trade restrictions and fixed costs (Romer, 1994; Evenett and 
Venables 2002; Haveman and Hummels, 2004; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Hallak, 2006; 
Eaton and Kortum, 2002; and Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). HMR build on this argument 
and use it to address the selection bias in gravity equations with help from a Probit model of 
trade partnership, where the factors determining the fixed costs of trade play an important role. 
HMR also make the important point that heterogeneity of firms may play a non-trivial role in 
both partnership formation and trade level. Their empirical results indeed confirm that failing to 
control for the heterogeneity and selection effects could significantly bias the trade elasticity 
estimates based on the gravity approach. 
The most popular empirical applications of the gravity model are those that examine the 
impact of various forms of regional economic integration, such as the role of regional trade 
agreements (Frankel et al., 1998), currency unions (Rose, 2000; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001), 
membership in GATT/WTO (Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007). Many studies draw 
attention to a number of other aspects of trade costs, such as common borders, common 
language, common legal system, common religion, colonial and ethnic ties (Gould, 1994; 
Frankel et al., 1998; Rauch and Trindade, 2002). HMR introduce indicators of regulation costs as 
determinants of fixed cost of trade and use them to estimate a model with trade partnership 
formation, from which they derive controls for heterogeneity and selection biases in the gravity 
equation. We will discuss the institutional factors included in these studies in more detail below. 
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1.2 Institutional Factors and International Trade 
While the initial idea behind gravity models was that trade must be inversely related to 
geographic distance, it was later realized that many non-geographic factors could also affect 
trade costs and shape the volume of trade. In particular, the role of differences in language, legal 
system, and many other characteristics were added to the gravity equations as potential drivers of 
trade costs. In recent years, there has been greater recognition that institutions governing 
economic activity and policymaking may also be consequential for trade through their impact on 
transaction costs. For a review of these issues, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).  
There are many empirical papers on gravity model that incorporate institutional factors.1 
Among the important contributions to this part of the literature, Anderson and Young (2002) 
employ a general equilibrium framework to show that trade insecurity in the form of imperfect 
contract enforcement generates a price mark-up when entry into the international market entails 
fixed costs. They derive the ad valorem tariff equivalent of the imperfection in contracting. This 
measure increases as institutional quality decrease and, thus, helps explain the low levels of 
North-South trade compared to that of North-North, despite greater differences in relative factor 
endowments between North and South Countries than among North countries. This result is 
empirically investigated by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), who use three indicators of 
institutional quality derived from a World Economic Forum (WEF) dataset, which consists of a 
survey of 3000 firms in 58 countries in 1997. Two of the indicators are meant to measure 
whether government policies are transparent and impartial and whether the legal system is 
effective in enforcing contracts. The third indicator is a “composite security” index that serves as 
a broader institutional quality measure. The effective contract enforcement is particularly 
important since insecurities associated with international trade create some hidden transaction 
costs which may dampen trade. Using 1996 bilateral import data for 48 countries, they find that 
the transparency of government significantly increases trade whereas contract enforceability has 
a marginally significant positive effect. The “composite security” index is found to have a highly 
significant and positive effect on imports. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) deal with the zero 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Groot, Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian (2004), Duc, Lavallee and Siroen (2009), Li and 
Samsell (2009), Linders, Groot and Rietveld (2005), Linders, Slangen, Groot and Beugelsdijk (2005) and Kim and 
Reinert (2009).  
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trade observations in their sample by running Tobit regressions, which unlike the Heckman 
selection approach, assume that the formation of partnerships and the level of trade are 
determined by the same process. The results support the important role of institutions in trade. 
However, as Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) point out, there may be two problems associated 
with constructing institutional variables based on the WEF survey. First, the sample is not 
completely random as the participants are from currently running firms; none has chosen to shut 
down or relocate. Second, the expectations in each country may be different than those in other 
countries, hence the results might not be comparable.  
Dutt and Traca (2009) examine the impact of corruption on trade in a gravity model and 
find ambiguous effects of corruption on trade, depending on whether evasion or extortion effects 
dominate. At low initial levels, an increase in corruption could increase trade flows. At high 
initial levels, on the other hand, increased corruption might not contribute to trade and, indeed, 
extortion might dominate and reduce trade flows. To test this hypothesis, Dutt and Traca (2007) 
add the ICRG corruption indicators for the importing and exporting countries to the right-hand 
side of a gravity model. They estimate the model using OLS with time and country fixed effects. 
They also run the model using Heckman selection procedure to deal with zero trade flows, 
though they do not incorporate exclusion restriction to ensure the reliability of the procedure. 
The probability of trade equation shows that corruption is significant for the exporting but not for 
the importing side of trade. On the other hand, the trade level equation shows that corruption is 
significant for the importing side, but ceases to be significant for the exporting side. 
Similarly, using selection-based gravity modeling of trade flows, Francois and Manchin 
(2007) analyze the impact of infrastructure and institutional quality on the bilateral trade 
patterns. Their institution variables are taken from “Economic Freedom of the World” database 
which consists of several measures reflecting “economic freedom,” such as freedom to trade, 
credit markets regulation, property rights, size of government, and more. Their import data 
covers the period 1988-2002, but there are only 6 observations available for the institutional 
variables (in five year increments for 1985-2000, and for 2001 and 2002).  Francois and Manchin 
(2007) interpolate for the years with missing values. They use exporter, importer, and time fixed 
effects, but do not use an excluded variable for the trade level regression. Their results show that 
both the bilateral trade partnership formation and variations in the level of bilateral trade depend 
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significantly on institutional quality and access to good transportation and communication 
systems. 
1.3 Conflict and International Trade 
There is a vast literature on the interaction between international conflict and trade. Since 
the measures of conflict and time span of samples vary among most of those studies, making 
comparisons is not an easy task. However, all the efforts are to answer either one or both of these 
two questions: Does trade reduce conflict? Does conflict reduce trade?  
One group of studies addresses the first question. Many of these studies claim support for 
the so-called Kantian (or liberal) thesis that trade brings peace.2 A recent example is Xiang, Xu 
and Keteku (2007), who estimate a Logit model for 1870-1992 period using the onset of 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) as a dependent variable. They argue that the lack of 
support for the liberal thesis in some studies is due to the exclusion of an indicator for major 
powers. They lag all right hand side variables one year to avoid simultaneity and use four 
different measures for trade: (1) The square root of the product of the ratios of dyadic trade over 
total trade for each country in the dyad. (2) The square root of the product of the ratios of dyadic 
trade over each country’s GDP. (3) The minimum of the ratios of dyadic trade over GDP for 
each country (Depend Low). (4) The maximum of the ratios of dyadic trade over GDP for each 
country (Depend High). The first two measures are included separately on the right-hand side, 
whereas the last two enter into regressions together. Only Depend High measure turns to be 
insignificant in explaining MID’s. By looking at the significance of these measures, Xiang, Xu 
and Keteku (2007) conclude that increased trade lowers the probability of international conflict.  
    The empirical results supporting the liberal thesis have faced a range of criticisms, 
such as exclusion of fixed effects, simultaneity between conflict and trade, and inappropriate 
specification.3 For example, Kim and Rousseau (2005) estimate a simultaneous equation Probit 
model for 1960-1988 and find that the positive effect of economic interdependence on conflict 
                                                 
2 See, among others, Polachek (1980), Russet and Oneal (2001), Garztke and Li (2003), Dorussen (2006), Oneal, 
Russet and Berbaum(2003), Reuveny (2001), Xiang, Xu, Keteku (2007), Chang, Polachek and Robst (2007) and 
Reuveny and Kang (1996). 
3 Barbieri (2002), Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004), Goenner (2004), Green, Kim 
and Yoon (2001) and Kim and Rousseau (2005). 
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disappears, while the negative effect of conflict on probability of trade stays. A similar result is 
obtained by Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004) by using MID’s as conflict indicator. They did 
not find any support for the liberals’ claim that trade brings peace but show that conflict reduces 
trade. A more recent study by Glick and Taylor (2010) find that the impact of trade on conflict is 
not statistically significant when controlling for dyad fixed effects. Morrow (1999) argues that 
based on the theory of initiation and escalation of conflicts the impact of trade interdependence 
on conflict is uncertain. Although being in a trade relationship can lower the incentives to engage 
in a war, lower willingness of the target to get into a fight makes it an easier target for coercion 
from the perspective of the initiator.  
Whether conflict has a significant impact on trade is also ambiguous in the existing 
literature. Many studies find a negative impact of conflict on trade4, whereas Polachek (1980), 
Morrow, Siverson and Taberes (1998) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) did not find any 
significant effects. Kim and Rousseau (2005) examine the impact of conflict on the probability 
of trade and find that the conflict reduces the probability of two countries engage in trade. One of 
the studies that find conflict reduces the trade is Anderton and Carter (2001). Their primary focus 
is to investigate the impact of wars on dyadic trade of 14 major power dyads that are involved in 
war since 1870. They also analyze 13 cases where at least one partner in a dyad is a non-major 
power. The variables they use to control for conflict are War Level and War Trend. War Level is 
a binary variable that equals 0 for every year passed without an occurrence of war and takes the 
value 1 after. War Trend is initially set to 0 and counts the years after a war begins. Their results 
show that the War Level coefficients are positive for 2 dyads in their sample and negative and 
also significant in 7 out of 12 dyads. The coefficients of War Trend are positive in 3 cases; 2 are 
significant and contradict with the hypothesis that war disrupts trade and negative in the other 11 
dyads with 8 of them are significant. They conclude that they have found reasonably strong 
evidence in favor of the argument that war lowers trade. 
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) argue that Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) 
play an important role in reducing the military disputes and increasing the trade flows. They 
estimate various models using 1950-1985 data and MID’s as conflict variable and show that their 
                                                 
4 Oneal, Russet and Berbaum (2003), Anderton and Carter (2001), Andrew Long (2008), Simmons (2005), Pollins 
(1989), Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004) and Glick and Taylor (2010). 
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results are robust to different specifications and estimation methods. Moreover, their results do 
not depend on whether they focus on the onset of MID’s or ongoing MID’s.  They don’t find any 
statistically significant impact of MID’s on bilateral trade flows. Their results also show that 
PTA’s reduce military disputes and have an important effect on the relationship between trade 
flows and conflict. 
Another study that finds an insignificant effect of conflict on trade is Morrow, Siverson 
and Taberes (1998). They focus on a relatively long time period 1907-1990 and use directed 
dyad exports as dependent variable and MID’s as conflict variable. They estimate their model 
with various specifications and also check for possible simultaneity. Their results show that 
neither the conflict nor the amount of trade between a dyad has any significant effect on each 
other.  
Crude oil has been long neglected in both trade and conflict literature despite being 
regarded as a strategic commodity. To date, we could not find any study that focuses solely on 
crude oil trade, but there are a few papers that partly or indirectly analyze it.  
The earliest study is by Polachek (1980), which examines the liberal view that trade 
reduces conflict. He argues that conflict may be particularly sensitive to the trade in strategic 
commodities such as oil. By looking at the impact of conflict on trade for selected countries, he 
notes that with its concentration on oil exports, Saudi Arabia has very low, in fact negative, 
trade-conflict elasticity as an importer and very high positive trade-conflict elasticity as an 
exporter. His conclusion is that “a country exporting an exceedingly strategic commodity can use 
its monopoly power without worry about being hostile” and “oil importers minimize hostility to 
Saudi Arabia”. 
In a more recent study, Helmers and Pasteels (2005) apply a gravity framework to 
disaggregated trade data in 19 ISIC sectors to examine the trade potentials of transition 
economies and developing countries.  Using 2002-2003 average of trade data for 103 countries 
they estimate a gravity model and include a tariff measure. When they use this tariff measure at 
disaggregated level they ignore the actual realizations and use the lowest tariff applied by an 
importing country to all of its trading partners.  In their gravity estimations they also add a 
variable to account for conflict intensity between a dyad. Their conflict variable is taken from 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research changing between 0 to 4, 0 being in 
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peace and 4 being in war. The conflict index takes account of the intensity and also the duration 
of conflict. They use exporter and importer fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance 
terms of Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood procedure as 
their estimation method.  They find negative and significant effect of conflict on trade in 5 out of 
19 sectors including petroleum industry.  
Nugent and Yousef (2005) examine whether intra-regional and extra-regional trade of 
MENA countries is less than what the theory predicts using gravity framework. They also work 
on simulations of alternative trade regime scenarios to strengthen the trade within MENA 
countries and between MENA and European Union countries. They use the bilateral trade in 
1970-1992 in five year increments for 186 countries and also disaggregate data into energy (oil-
gas) and non-energy sub-groups. The indicator variables for one or both partners being an oil 
exporter display high negative significance for non-energy and total trade. The role of being an 
oil exporter in explaining energy trade is somewhat different. If both partners are oil exporters it 
reduces the trade between them significantly, whereas if only one partner is an oil exporter it has 
a positive effect on trade. Hence, they conclude that the high endowment of energy resources can 
be the reason why MENA countries trade less than their potential. Their comparison of predicted 
and actual values of trade also shows that MENA countries’ performance is below their potential 
in international trade. 
1.4 Economic Growth and Oil Prices 
Understanding the reasons behind the fluctuations in oil prices and the impact of oil 
prices on economy has been long receiving the attention of many economists. Most studies focus 
on the latter and use empirical methods to quantify the negative effects of high oil prices on 
macroeconomic indicators. After the early 1970’s, many economists came to believe that the 
changes in price of oil were an important determinant for macroeconomic fluctuations. However, 
this view has started to change in the past decades as economic conditions have changed and the 
assumptions behind that belief have been challenged (Barsky and Kilian, 2004). It has been 
commonly observed in empirical studies that the statistical relationship between the oil price and 
the macroeconomic variables has weakened over time. Notably, two oil shocks since 1990 which 
were comparable to those in 1970’s have not been followed by stagflation, which was associated 
with the earlier oil shocks. 
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Barsky and Kilian (2004) review the belief that increase in oil prices are the reason for 
macroeconomic problems like high inflation rates, lower productivity and growth. They examine 
a number of theories in detail for the negative effects of oil prices on macroeconomic 
performance with references to actual data and to results of many studies that challenge the 
belief (Olson, 1988; Hulten, Robertson and Wykoff, 1989; Bohi, 1991). They argue that none of 
the models supporting this belief can provide solid empirical support and conclude that the 
evidence for the “alleged” link from oil price changes to macroeconomic performance has been 
mostly overstated. Moreover, implications of some theories would not be supported by US 
macroeconomic data. They also show that in explaining stagflation in real GDP oil price shocks 
are neither necessary nor sufficient. As a result their conclusion is that the impact of oil market 
fluctuations is much less than what has been usually considered. 
Blanchard and Gali (2008) use data from industrialized economies and compare the effect 
of oil price shocks on growth, inflation and other macroeconomic indicators before and after 
1983. Their VAR analysis shows that the dynamic effects of oil shocks have decreased 
considerably over time, with much smaller effects on macroeconomic measures such as output 
and employment. They also use a theoretical model to examine four hypotheses to explain the 
reasons for reduced effects of oil price shocks over time. Their calibration results favor all of the 
four: different nature of oil shocks, lower share of oil in production, more flexible labor markets, 
and developments in monetary policy. Hence, they conclude that the mixed results obtained in 
previous studies are due to the time-varying impacts of oil prices on macro-economy. 
In order to understand the reasons behind the increase in oil prices many explanations 
have been proposed including the role of speculation in oil futures and spot markets, negative 
shocks to oil supply, intentional restrictions of crude oil production by OPEC, and changes in 
global economic activity. Barsky and Kilian (2004) compare the popular explanations for the 
source of oil price shocks such as the role of cartels, major political events in Middle East and 
embargoes. They argue that these factors are not exogenous contrary to common view but 
dependent on global macroeconomic conditions.  Moreover, by observing the recent events one 
can see the connection of high oil prices to these factors are quite loose. The turmoil in Middle 
East occurs without causing any increase in price of oil and the latter occurs even in the absence 
of such shocks. On the other hand, OPEC is no more a powerful group, lost his influence since 
1986 and not able to force a prolonged increase in oil prices since then. In addition, they stress 
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the importance of macroeconomic conditions on the price of oil directly by shifting the demand 
for oil. Two important examples are the drop in oil price after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and 
after the first signs of recession emerged in US economy in late 2000.   
Hamilton (2009) agrees with Barsky and Kilian (2004) that the 2007-2008 oil price shock 
was due to increasing demand for crude oil which is fueled by the high growth in world economy 
and stagnating world production of crude oil. But he argues that the previous oil price shocks 
were mainly caused by disruptions in oil supply. He discusses the fundamentals of economics to 
explain the oil price increase. He also explains the view that speculators in importing countries 
cause an increase in spot prices by forecasting the oil shortages. He also notes that a very low 
price elasticity of oil demand, much lower than the standard estimates, is needed to rationalize 
both economic fundamentals and role of speculation arguments.   
Kilian and Hicks (2009) explain the increase in oil prices during 2000-2008 by the 
unexpected strong growth in world economy, especially in Asia. In their model they don’t rely 
on econometric estimates to infer demand shocks but use direct measures of demand shocks 
based on professional GDP forecasts provided by Economist Intelligence Unit. Their main 
conclusion is that the rise in global demand due to unexpected growth in emerging economies 
like China and India played the biggest role in increase in real price of oil until the first half of 
2008. This is further supported by the unexpected high growth in some OECD economies, 
especially in Japan. Similarly, much of the decline in the real price of oil is explained by large 
negative growth shocks after the first half of 2008 in both economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
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CHAPTER 2 
IDENTIFYING FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND SELECTION EFFECTS 
IN TRADE FLOWS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The decline in trade costs over the past several decades has been associated with rapid 
growth in world trade. This expansion seems to have come about largely as a result of increased 
variety of products being exported (expansion at the extensive margin), rather than increased 
volumes of existing products (intensive margin) or formation of new trade partnerships among 
country pairs that did not transact with each other before (Yi, 2003; Hummels and Klenow, 
2005; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2009). To understand the forces behind these trends and the factors that 
shape the pattern of trade around the globe, the gravity model has been put to use as the main 
workhorse with increased details and sophistication.1 However, the estimation of the gravity 
model has been fraught with difficulties. In particular, a major problem has been the prevalence 
zero trade in bilateral relationships, which could be the source of large biases in the estimation of 
trade elasticities.2 In recent years, the idea that the zero trade flows may be due to the fixed costs 
of exporting has been proposed as a means of dealing with the selection bias in the gravity 
equation (see Hallak, 2006, Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007, and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 
2008). The latter study, HMR hereafter, further notes that in the presence of firm heterogeneity, 
such fixed costs may account for the large role of the extensive margin, an effect that could bias 
the measurement of trade elasticities unless it is separated carefully from the changes at the 
intensive margin.  
   In their seminal paper, HMR show how the potential estimation biases in the gravity 
equation may be addressed by means of a model of trade with heterogeneous firms based on the 
                                                 
1The literature on gravity models has grown truly large. For an excellent survey of gravity models and their results 
and challenges, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).  
2 About half of aggregate bilateral trade flows are zero in typical cross-country data samples. This share is much 
larger at more disaggregate product levels. See, Evenett and Venables (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), 
and Haveman and Hummels (2004) among many other studies.  
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framework developed by Melitz (2003). They derive two structural equations from their 
theoretical model and then estimate them empirically. The first equation determines the 
probability that there are positive exports from country j to country i, or "directed dyad ji." HMR 
estimate this equation as a Probit regression using the data for the set of all potential dyads. The 
second equation is a version of the gravity relationship, which determines the volume of exports 
from country j to country i when there are positive exports.  Using the Probit estimation, HMR 
derive the Mills ratio, which is a standard correction for the selection bias a la Heckman (1979), 
and another term that helps correct for the role of unobserved firm heterogeneity. This approach 
offers an effective way of measuring the impact of trade costs on the extensive and intensive 
margins of trade. 
A critical element required for HMR's empirical exercise is a variable that affects the 
probability of trade, but not its level, hence helping to ensure that the selection bias correction is 
not collinear with the other explanatory variables in the gravity equation.3 For this purpose, HMR 
use an indicator of entry regulation costs, which they argue affects the fixed costs of trade, but 
not the marginal costs. Their empirical tests using that indicator seem to support the theoretical 
claim. However, HMR’s empirical results suffer from two problems. First, the indicator of entry 
regulation costs (obtained from Djankov et al., 2002) is for 1999, while the data for the 
dependent variables are for the 1980s. Since many countries had gone through regulatory reform 
in the 1980s and 1990s, it is difficult to treat the variable selected by HMR for exclusion from 
the gravity equation as exogenous. Second, the data for other variables included in the 
regressions, especially the geographic distance between trade partners, contain errors. Once one 
corrects for those errors, the indicator of entry regulation costs ceases to be a valid excluded 
variable for the trade volume regression, thus putting the empirical results found by HMR in 
doubt. HMR also suggest an indicator of “Common Religion” as an alternative excluded 
variable, but that one also fails the exclusion restriction tests. Using either of these variables in 
                                                 
3 In principle, one may be able to estimate the gravity equation without employing an “excluded variable” in the 
Probit regressions since the inverse Mills ratio is generally non-linear in the parameters. Indeed, Wei and Zhang 
(2009) use this approach. However, this is not a satisfactory approach since a large Monte Carlo literature suggests 
that in general the bivariate normal models with no exclusion restriction perform rather poorly.  
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conjunction with different datasets in other studies has also led to a similar conclusion (see, for 
example, Wei and Zhang, 2009).4 
We argue that despite the data problems in the HMR paper, their theoretical claim can be 
sustained empirically if one employs an alternative proxy for the fixed costs of exporting. Our 
proposed proxy is the Risk of Contract Repudiation by the government, which is an index 
constructed by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995), using International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) dataset of the Political Risk Services, Inc. We argue that like the entry cost index used 
by HMR, the Contract Repudiation index should be expected to largely affect the fixed rather 
than variable costs of exports. Indeed, it seems to work in this way empirically. It also enjoys the 
advantage of having panel data for a large number of countries since the early 1980s. This allows 
the right-hand-side variables in the regressions explaining trade to enter contemporaneously or 
with a lag, rather than with a significant lead over the dependent variables on the left-hand side. 
Also, panel estimation enables us to assess the role of time-varying variables such as total 
country-level production and to control for directed-dyad fixed effects, thus addressing the 
problem of unobserved factors in bilateral relationships. Our results confirm HMR’s insight that 
firm heterogeneity plays a non-trivial role in the response of trade volumes to trade costs. 
However, the magnitudes of the selection and heterogeneity biases in trade elasticities caused by 
the absence of appropriate corrections turn out to be smaller than those measured by HMR.  
We make our case by starting in section 2.2 with a brief review of the HMR model. We 
then describe the data and highlight the problems with HMR’s estimation in section 2.3. In 
section 2.4, we argue why the exporter Contract Repudiation index may primarily influence the 
fixed costs of trade, rather than the variable costs. We then proceed to estimate the HMR model 
and discuss its results, using our data and alternative excluded variable. Section 2.5 concludes 
the paper. 
                                                 
4 In HMR regressions, the indicator of “Common Language” also appears to have the potential to serve as the 
excluded variable and has been used in other studies, for example, Belenkiy (2009) and Shepotylo (2009). However, 
our dataset again casts doubt on the appropriateness of that variable for exclusion. Johnson (2009) suggests another 
alternative excluded variable: The lagged value of trade partnership. This seems promising, but potential serial 
correlation may make it problematic to use.  
14 
 
2.2 Description of the Model  
 The HMR model starts with the decisions of firms at the micro level whether to enter the 
market and whether to export or not. These actions entail fixed costs that affect the firms' 
decisions to take them or not, but not its activity levels when it produces or exports. This feature 
implies that explaining whether a given country j exports to country i requires a different set of 
variables than those that explain the level of trade when the value is positive. Suppose that firms 
produce differentiated products that have constant elasticity of substitution for consumers, . The 
firms also vary by a factor, a, which affects their unit costs of production. Let  
(1) G(a) = k
L
k
H
k
L
k
aa
aa


, k >   1, 
be the time-invariant distribution of a with support [aL, aH], where aH > aL > 0. In this situation, 
for country j to be exporting to country i, the most efficient firm in j (a = aL) must find it 
profitable to sell its output to the consumers in i. Following HMR's derivations, one can show 
that this will be the case if5 
(2) zjit = 0  cjt + (1)(jit + aL  pit) + yit  fjit + ujit > 0,  
where 0 is a constant, ujit ~ N(0, u2) is a random factor affecting the variable profits of 
exporting from j to i at time t, and the remaining variables are defined as follows: 
cjt: log of average unit cost of  production in country j at time t,  
jit: log of unit trade costs of exporting from j to i at time t,  
pit: log of the average price in country i at time t, 
yit: log of total expenditure in country i at time t, 
fjit: log of the fixed costs of exporting from j to i at time t  
The fixed costs have a number of components. Specifically,  fjit xxjt + mmit + jit  
vjit, where vjit is a random factor distributed as N(0, v2), 's are parameters, mit is a fixed trade 
barrier imposed by the importing country on all exporters at time t, xjt is a measure of fixed 
                                                 
5 HMR do not specify any time dimension in their paper. Adding the time dimension, as we do here, is 
straightforward. 
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export costs common across all export destinations at time t, and jit is a measure of any 
additional country-pair specific fixed trade costs. These fixed cost components may be further 
decomposed into time-variant and time-invariant components.  
 Given the above specification,  the random element in (1) will be jit = vjit + ujit,  where 
jit ~ N(0, 2) and 2 = u2 + v2. Using Tjit as a dichotomous indicator of trade, the probability 
that country j exports to country i at time t (Tjit = 1) can be expressed as: 
(3)  Pr(Tjit=1| observables) = [

1 (0  cjt  (1)(jit + aL  pit) + yit  xxjt  mmit  jit)], 
where  is cdf of unit-normal distribution. 
 When exports from j to i are positive, the log of the export volume is determined by: 
(4) x jit = 0  (1)cjt + njt  (1)( jit  pit ) + yit + wjit + ujit,  
where njt is the log of number of firms in the exporting country and wjit is related to the fraction 
firms that export from j to i. This is essentially the gravity equation, with the difference that it 
takes account of firm heterogeneity effect through wjit. A key observation of HMR is that wjit is a 
monotonic function of zjit. To be specific, given the specification of G(a), when zjit > 0,             
wjit = ln[exp(zjit) 1], where  = (k  +1)/ ( 1). This relationship is a central part of HMR's 
results because it allows one to estimate wjit based on the estimate of zjit from equation (3), *ˆ jitz , 
and then correct for the firm heterogeneity effect in the gravity equation. Furthermore, the 
estimate of jit from (3), offers a means of standard correction for the sample selection bias à la 
Heckman because E[ujit | ., Tjit = 1] = βuη *ˆ jit , where βuη ≡ corr (ujit, ujit)(σu/ση) and  *ˆ jit = 
E[jit/ση| ., Tjit = 1]. As a result, the gravity equation becomes: 
(5) x jit = 0  ( 1)cjt + njt  ( 1)( jit  pit ) + yit + ln[exp( *ˆ jitz )  1]  +βuη *ˆ jit +  ejit, 
where ejit is i.i.d. Note that the term containing *ˆ jitz  is nonlinear, which complicates the 
estimation procedure a bit. To ensure that the estimates are not sensitive to this complication, 
HMR also estimate (5) using a Taylor expansion of the nonlinear term and find that the results 
are largely unaffected.  
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 It is worth noting that unlike many recent gravity models that follow the framework 
developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), HMR’s model does not include a single 
“multilateral export resistance” term. This is because HMR assume that there is no competition 
over resources for exporting to different countries. For every directed dyad, there is a host of 
firms in the exporting country distributed according to G(a), independent of exports to other 
destinations from that country. As a result, the profitability of exports within the dyad need not 
be compared to an index of payoffs from exporting to alternative destinations. However, the 
value of such alternatives may be reflected in cjt and njt, and is ultimately captured by exporter 
fixed effects included in the empirical estimations of (3) and (5). The “multilateral import 
resistance” term in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is the same as pit, which is captured by 
importer fixed effects included in the empirical model.  
The crucial issue in the estimation of the system of equations (3) and (5) is that except the 
fixed-cost factors, all the variables determining *ˆ jitz  and 
*ˆ
jit  are included on the right-hand side 
of (5). As a result, finding variables that represent only the fixed costs and, thus, can be excluded 
in (5) is crucial in making it possible to identify the heterogeneity and selection effects in the 
gravity equation. In the next section, we next turn to the problems with HMR's choice of such an 
"excluded variable" and with their dataset.  
2.3 Data and Estimation Issues in HMR   
The main estimation exercise of HMR uses data for dyads of 116 countries in 1986.6 
Since only one year of data is used, some of the variables in (3) and (5) become part of exporter 
or importer fixed effects and are not identified separately. Specifically, cjt, xjt, and njt are 
included in an exporter fixed effect and pit and yit are incorporated into an importer fixed effect. 
As a result, the estimation exercise becomes focused on the determinants of variable and fixed 
costs of bilateral trade: jit and jit. For jit, the determinants consist of country-pair specific 
variables, particularly the distance between countries i and j and indicators of whether they share 
a border, the same legal system, the same colonial origin, a common dominant language. HMR 
also include indicators showing whether or not both countries are landlocked or islands and 
whether or not they are both members of the same free trade area, currency union, or the 
                                                 
6 Trade data is available for 158 countries, but the regulation costs data is restricted to 116 countries. 
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GATT/WTO. HMR also develop a continuous variable for the extent to which religious 
affiliations in the two countries are shared. The definitions of these variables and their sources 
are summarized in Table 2.1.  
For jit, HMR start with two possible determinants derived from cost of doing business 
data for 1999 (Djankov et al., 2002): Regulation Costs (a binary indicator that is unity if the cost 
of forming a business as percent of GDP per capita is above the median in the exporting country 
j and the importing country i) and entry Regulation Costs Based on Days and Procedures (a 
binary indicator that is unity if the sum of the number of days and procedures to form a business 
is above the median for both the exporting country j and importing country i).  
Using the dataset that HMR have made available through the Web, we reproduced the 
baseline results reported in Table 2 of their paper. Table 2.2 shows the results of this exercise, 
which yielded estimates close to those reported by HMR, but not exactly the same. This small 
difference is probably due to updating and changes in the dataset after the publication of the 
paper.7 The key result in Table 2.2 is that Regulation Cost as percent of GDP is statistically 
significant in the Probit estimation of equation (3), but not in the benchmark estimate of the 
gravity equation (5) before corrections are made for selection and heterogeneity. (The Days and 
Procedures indicator of Regulation Costs is marginally significant in the benchmark regression 
and, therefore, is not as reliable as the other indicator.) Based on these observations, HMR 
proceed to derive the variables that deal with those biases in the gravity equation, treating the 
Regulation Cost as percent of GDP as the excluded variable and using both non-linear and 
polynomial versions of equation (3).8 The results, given in the last two columns of Table 2.2, 
                                                 
7 In particular, HMR have recently corrected the religion variable that they use. (See the website of Marc Melitz at 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/melitz/papers_melitz). Another example of a correction is the change in the 
data for Kiribati. In their paper, HMR include Kiribati in the list of countries that lack regulation cost data, but their 
dataset does include the relevant information. Also, some corrections seem to be needed for the results that they 
report. In particular, based on their definitions of the variables and the estimations with the dataset, the signs of 
island and landlocked indicators in the regressions should be positive, while the paper shows negative coefficients 
for both variables in all tables. 
8 The transformation of the predicted probabilities from the Probit regression into *ˆ jitz  entails a complication: For a 
relatively small number of country dyads for which the probability of trade is very close or equal to 1, it is not 
possible to make any inference on the differences in *ˆ jitz ’s. HMR assign the value of 
*ˆ
jitz  for the country dyads with 
an estimated probability of 0.9999999 to all *ˆ jitz  for dyads with higher probabilities. This censoring affects less than 
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show that the bias correction terms are both statistically significant and their inclusion tends to 
lower the estimated effects of distance and other bilateral factors. Furthermore, HMR decompose 
the effects of reduced trade costs on intensive and extensive margins and find that the firm 
heterogeneity effect is the dominant factor. However, the variables and the data used by HMR 
entail problems that cast doubt on the results. 
One problem is that the Regulation Cost data are for a much later date than the trade data, 
raising the possibility of endogeneity of the instrument. Even if one ignores this issue, there are 
errors in the data that undermine the results more seriously. In particular, in many cases the 
distance variable in the HMR dataset does not seem to match the available measures of distance 
between countries. For example, the log distance indicator in their dataset is 5.50 for the Chile-
New Zealand dyad and 5.26 for Norway-New Zealand dyad, while the great-circle distances of 
the capital cities of these country pairs are about 9,000 km and 18,000 km, respectively. Once we 
use the log of the great circle distance, the Regulation Cost variables become significant (at the 
five percent level) in the baseline estimate of the gravity model and, thus, can no longer be 
treated as appropriate excluded variables (see Table 2.3). The significance levels of the other 
variables generally stay the same, except for the common Religion measure, which also becomes 
highly significant in the gravity regression even after the bias correction measures are 
introduced. The latter change is important because HMR propose Religion as an alternative 
excluded variable based on its empirical properties, which cease to apply once an alternate 
distance variable is used.9  
There appear to be errors in other variables in the dataset as well.10 To deal with these 
data issues, we reproduced the dataset, starting from the original data sources (see Table 2.1). 
The results of the model's re-estimation with the revised dataset for 1986 (shown in Table 2.4) 
                                                                                                                                                             
five percent of the country dyads included in the gravity equation. We follow the same procedure in replicating their 
regressions and in the estimating of our own model. 
9 Religion appears as an appropriate excluded variable based on HMR's dataset even after correction they make to 
the data for this variable. However, it remains significant in the trade volume regression in our regressions with the 
revised distance data and, thus, fails to serve the purpose. 
10 To give a few examples, in the dataset, many island countries such as Jamaica and Madagascar are not coded as 
such. Also, the landlocked dummy equals 1 for Syria, the common language dummy takes the value 1 for United 
Arab Emirates and Brazil, and the common religion variable equals 0.95 for Saudi Arabia and Norway! 
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strengthen our conclusion that neither the Regulation Cost indicators nor the common Religion 
variable work as empirically appropriate excluded variables.  
Besides the empirical weaknesses of the Regulation Cost variables, there are also 
conceptual concerns regarding its validity for the task at hand. Unlike the other bilateral 
variables included in the HMR regressions which are based on factors that two countries share 
(such as border, language, …), the Regulation Cost variables signal the costs of entry that occur 
in each country separately being relatively high in both. It is not clear why such costs should 
affect trade in an interactive fashion as specified by HMR, rather than as an additive one. Also, 
there is no reason to believe that Regulation Costs in both exporting and importing country affect 
the fixed cost of trade the same way. In particular, the regulatory barriers in importing countries 
usually fall on per unit trade, while the entry barriers in exporting countries may have a bigger 
impact on the fixed costs of forming export activities. Testing for additive vs. interactive role of 
such costs and their possible asymmetry is not possible in HMR dataset because it focuses on a 
single-year observation of Regulation Costs, which rules out the use of any individual country 
characteristic once one accounts for a country fixed effect in the regression. The variable that we 
propose benefits from panel data availability, which allows us to examine the role of asymmetry 
and additive vs. interactive fixed costs of trade between trading partners.  
2.4 An Alternative Determinant of Fixed Costs of Trade 
We propose the indicator of risk of Contract Repudiation in ICRG dataset as a 
determinant of fixed costs of exporting. The variable is defined as an indicator that "addresses 
the possibility that foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants face the risk of a modification 
in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down due to an income 
drop, budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in 
government economic and social priorities." Our claim is that such risks, and the efforts to 
overcome them, should have a major effect on the fixed costs of setting up production and 
arranging exports, but not necessarily the variable costs. This is, of course, a hypothesis that we 
try to validate empirically, using the same approach as HMR. To avoid the problems that the 
ordinal nature of this variable may pose for our analysis, we form a binary indicator that takes 
the value one if contract repudiation in a country in a given year is less than the median score of 
all countries in that year and equals zero otherwise. We construct this Contract Repudiation 
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indicator separately for each country to represent xjt and mit. We also interact these two 
variables for each dyad to form a proxy for jit, the same way that HMR handle the Regulation 
Cost indicators. To the extent that these variables affect only the fixed cost of trade, they should 
appear with significant negative coefficients in equation (3), but not in equation (5). It is, of 
course, possible that they may have significant coefficients in the gravity equation as well, or 
prove insignificant in both or have the wrong sign. These are issues that ultimately need to be 
settled empirically. 
The dataset that we use is an unbalanced panel that covers 15,500 directed dyads 
involving 125 countries during 1982-1997.11 However, due to missing data points, we end up 
with a total of 189,592 observations that have complete information, amounting to an average of 
about 12 years of data per directed dyad. Extending the data to dates before 1982 or after 1997 is 
difficult because of the limitations of the current versions of ICRG data. Moreover, data on 
bilateral trade flows after 1997 are also limited.12  
In our baseline results, we include all the variables employed in HMR regressions other 
than the Regulation Cost indicators. We add another bilateral variable that shows the presence of 
ongoing hostility between exporting and importing countries. The reason for adding this variable 
is that it has significant negative correlation with the probability of trade and seems to be a 
natural factor to control like other bilateral variables. It also turns out to be insignificant in the 
gravity equation once we include the bias control terms. This feature makes Ongoing Hostility a 
good candidate for use as an alternative excluded variable. 
To account for the changes in country conditions with respect to the number of firms and 
cost of production (njt and cjt) in exporting countries and the distribution costs and the aggregate 
demand level (affecting jit, pit and yit) in the importing countries, we include in the regressions 
the level of GDP (in US dollars) and the Rule of Law index (from ICRG dataset) for both 
exporter and importer in each dyad. The latter variable also captures the overall institutional 
                                                 
11 This dataset does not include the countries that have broken up after 1990 and the countries that have been 
formed, namely the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.  
12 The trade dataset that contains information for flows after 1997 is not quite compatible with the previous one and 
lacks trade volumes when the value falls below US$100,000, a feature that complicates the estimation of the system. 
See Feenstra's website on "World Import and Export data" at www.internationaldata.org. 
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environments of the trading countries that may affect the overall costs of trade. This should help 
reduce the chance that such broad cost effects are picked up by the Contract Repudiation 
indicator, which is intended to represent a fixed cost factor.13 We include exporter and importer 
fixed effects, as in HMR, to control for many unobserved fixed country characteristics. We also 
include a time fixed effect in the regressions to control for the role of global shocks to the trading 
system. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.5.14  
The main new features in Table 2.5 compared with the results reported for 1986 in Table 
2.4 is the use of panel data and the introduction of the Contract Repudiation indicators for 
exporter and importers. The exporter Contract Repudiation proves significant in determining the 
probability of trade, but not in the gravity equation. The opposite is true for the importer Contract 
Repudiation. This conforms to the conjecture made at the end of the previous section that the 
risks on the exporter side may largely affect fixed costs of trade, while the risks on importing 
side may significantly influence the variable costs.  
We also ran regressions that included the interaction term of the exporter and importer 
Contract Repudiation indicators by itself and in conjunction with those two indicators. For the 
pooled panel regressions, those exercises yield results that are very similar to those shown in 
Table 2.4. (The estimates are not shown here to save space.) The interaction term turns out to be 
significant in the trade probability regression, but not in the trade volume regression. The 
importer Contract Repudiation, when included, remains statistically significant in both 
regressions, as in Table 2.5, while the exporter Contract Repudiation loses its significance in the 
trade probability regression. However, as we will see below, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is not robust and seems to owe its effect to the role of exporter Contract Repudiation. This 
leads us to believe that the fixed costs of initiating exports depend largely on the Contract 
Repudiation on the exporter side, rather than the importer side or the interaction of the two.    
                                                 
13 An alternative to the inclusion of variables such as GDP and Rule of Law is to use time varying exporter and 
importer fixed effects (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007). However, this rules out the use of excluded variables that we 
need for addressing the selection bias in the gravity equation. Our assumption is that the basic structure of the 
country effects (including “multilateral resistance” terms) is stable and their variations over time are by and large 
captured by the country characteristics that we have included in the model.  
14 Note that the sample used in the Probit regression contains 175,309 observations. The reason is that 9 exporters 
export to everywhere, yielding 14,283 observations to be dropped. These observations are included in the random 
effect Logit regressions. 
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One concern over the results reported in Table 2.5 is the possibility of unobservable 
factors in bilateral relationships that may affect selection and heterogeneity effects. To address 
this concern, we introduce directed-dyad random and fixed effects in equations (3) and (5). To 
estimate the probability of trade with those effects, we employ Logit, which is the technique 
available in Stata for panel fixed effects. We also estimate the Logit version of equation (3) with 
pooled panel data to make it easier to assess the role of random and fixed effects. Table 2.6 
shows results, which confirm the validity of exporter Contract Repudiation as an appropriate 
excluded variable.15 It is notable that the coefficient estimates in the presence of random effect 
are larger than in the pooled panel regression (see the first two columns of Table 2.6). This is 
also the case for the gravity equation, except for the ongoing hostility indicator, which loses its 
significance, and the selection and heterogeneity terms, which have smaller coefficient. The 
latter outcome suggests that the biases may be smaller than those found in the pooled panel 
regressions. (Compare the gravity equation estimates reported in Table 2.5 and 2.6.) Indeed, the 
introduction of the bias correction terms in the random-effect gravity model leads to smaller 
changes in the coefficient estimates, when compared to the pooled regressions.     
To estimate the probability of trade with directed-dyad fixed effects, again we use Stata’s 
“xtlogit.” The inclusion of dyad fixed effects obviates exporter and importer fixed effects as well 
as all the time-invariant bilateral variables included in earlier tables. It also reduces the size of 
the sample used in the estimation of equation (3) by more than half, from 189,592 to 90,356. 
(This is because the dyad fixed effects can fully account for the observations where the dyad has 
always traded or has never traded for the duration of the sample, hence the exclusion of those 
observations from the regression.) Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the regressions with fixed 
effects because they can better account for unobserved factors. Table 2.7 shows the results with 
different specifications regarding the interaction term for Contract Repudiation. The first column 
Table 2.7 indicates that the use of dyad fixed effects does not change the results for the exporter 
Contract Repudiation, as it retains its significance. However, the second and third columns show 
that the interaction term is not significant when included by itself or in combination with the 
exporter and importer Contract Repudiation. We thus conclude that the exporter Contract 
Repudiation is the main factor here that affects the fixed costs of trade. The roles of the other 
                                                 
15 Note that the figures in this table are the coefficients of the variables in the exponential expression, not the 
marginal probabilities as in Table 2.5. 
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variables that remain in the regression remain largely unchanged, though their coefficients 
increase somewhat relative to those obtained under the random effects. 
 The results of using directed-dyad fixed effects in the gravity regression are shown in 
Table 2.8. The figures in the first column show the benchmark regression without selection and 
heterogeneity controls. These figures are very similar to the corresponding random effect results 
in the third column of Table 2.6 for the variables that the two tables have in common. To control 
for the selection and heterogeneity effects, we derive the necessary terms from the random 
effects version of equation (3) reported in the second column of Table 2.6.16 We only estimate 
the polynomial version of equation (5) with fixed effects because using linear fixed effect terms 
in a nonlinear equation poses difficult challenges. As the second column of Table 2.8 shows, for 
the variables that remain in the fixed effect regression, the signs and significance levels of the 
coefficients are the same as those in the pooled and random-effect regressions. However, their 
magnitudes tend to be larger than what we found in the pooled regression (compare the second 
column of Table 2.8 with the last column of Table 2.5) and somewhat smaller than the results of 
the random-effect regression (reported in the last column of Table 2.6). To gauge the role of the 
time-invariant dyad variables that drop out of the fixed effect regressions, we regress the 
directed-dyad fixed effects on them and show the results in Table 2.9. The estimated coefficients 
are again generally higher than the corresponding ones in the pooled regression and lower than 
those in the random-effect regression. Interestingly, the extent of bias correction (differences 
from the corresponding benchmarks) is also in-between the pooled and random-effect 
regressions; typically larger than those in the random-effect approach. This suggests that the 
pooled regression may underestimate and the random-effect approach may overestimate the 
coefficients of the gravity model. The extent of bias correction, on the other hand, seems to be 
overestimated in the pooled regressions and underestimated in the random-effect ones. 
The estimation results in Tables 2.5-2.9 provide empirical support for the exporter 
Contract Repudiation as a useful excluded variable. This is further confirmed by the statistical 
significance of the terms capturing the selection and heterogeneity effects in both the nonlinear 
and polynomial estimations of the gravity regression. Importantly, the results support the 
                                                 
16 Using the fixed effect Logit version restricts the sample considerably without any substantive consequence for the 
fixed effect gravity equation. Using the pooled panel version for this purpose (first column of Table 2.5) does not 
change the main results in any substantive way. 
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theoretical insights of HMR that there are biases at the intensive and extensive margins of trade 
and that the latter could play a significant role. Indeed, decomposing the selection and 
heterogeneity biases, as in third and fourth columns of Table 2.8, shows that the main change in 
the estimates comes as a result of adding the heterogeneity effect term, *ˆ jitz . The same results 
obtain when we use pooled or random effect regressions, confirming HMR's results regarding 
the dominance of the firm heterogeneity effect in determining trade flows.  
An important issue that HMR address based on their estimation results is the magnitude 
and variation of the elasticity of trade volume with respect to trade costs. They carry out an 
experiment by lowering distance by 10% and then measuring the elasticity for trade across three 
dyad types: North-North, North-South, and South-South.17 They find that trade elasticities are 
generally larger than one and tend to be higher for the developing countries. We obtain 
somewhat lower estimates in a more compressed range by repeating the exercise using our 
pooled and random effect panel regressions (see Table 2.10). In particular, the range of 
elasticities turns out to be smaller for the South countries. These results naturally follow from the 
lower bias and the lower estimates that we find for the trade response to various factors when we 
use panel data. Inclusion of additional variables (GDP, Rule of Law, and Ongoing Hostility) has 
also played a role by reducing the share of variation attributable to distance.  
 Before closing this section, it is worth examining the consequences of using panel data 
and our alternative excluded variable for the indicators included in the regressions. For the 
bilateral variables considered by HMR, the signs and significance levels of the marginal 
probability effect in the Probit regression are generally similar between the pooled panel 
regression in Table 2.5 and those obtained for 1986 in Table 2.4. However, using the panel 
features of the data and adding new variables (GDP, Rule of Law, and Ongoing Hostility) tend to 
lower the magnitudes of the estimated marginal probabilities. As one expects, being 
geographically closer, having a common language, religion, legal origin, currency union, and 
free trade area raise the trade probability and volume (when trade is positive). The same is true 
for reduced hostility levels. Sharing colonial ties, border, or island status also raises trade 
                                                 
17 North consists of nineteen countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and the United States. All other countries are in the South. 
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volumes, but does not seem to increase the probability of positive trade. A shared border in fact 
seems to have the anomalous effect of lower trade probability. Sharing landlocked status also 
displays counterintuitive negative effects on trade probabilities and volumes.  
The time-varying country variables—GDP and Rule of Law—both tend to have large and 
positive effects on trade probability, as expected. However, in contrast to typical gravity model 
estimations, the elasticity of trade with respect to GDP turns out to be much smaller than 1.  
An important observation in comparing Tables 2.4 with 2.5, 2.6, or 2.8 is that the bias 
corrections in the gravity equation (the difference of columns 3 and 4 with column 2) tend to be 
notably smaller in the panel data estimates. Accounting for panel effects and adding new 
variables seem to indicate smaller biases than measured by HMR, though the directions and 
significance levels remain valid. 
Finally, it is notable that all the bilateral variables included in HMR’s study remain 
significant in the gravity equation even after we correct for selection and heterogeneity. This 
undermines their suggestion that variables such as common Religion and Language indicators, 
which lose their significance in HMR’s gravity regressions, may be used as alternative excluded 
variables.18 However, our study indicates that the Ongoing Hostility indicator may serve such a 
purpose.19 
2.5 Conclusion 
 The model developed by HMR is extremely insightful about the determinants of 
international trade. Our aim in this paper has been to examine the empirical basis for their 
theoretical insights. A crucial element in such empirical analysis is identifying a variable that 
affects the fixed costs of exporting from one country to another, but not the variable costs 
(“excluded variable”). We argue that the nature of the variable that HMR had selected for this 
purpose and some errors in the dataset weaken their empirical case for the theoretical 
observations. We propose an alternative “excluded variable” that addresses those concerns. It 
benefits from the existence of panel data contemporaneous with the trade data and it fulfills the 
                                                 
18 HMR focus on the use of common Religion as an excluded variable. Shepotylo (2009) employs common 
Language for this purpose. 
19 We take advantage of such a possibility in another study of ours that focuses on energy trade. 
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empirical requirements for an excluded variable regardless of the model specification. The 
results confirm HMR’s finding that firm heterogeneity plays a significant role in the response of 
trade volumes to trade costs. However, the magnitude of selection and heterogeneity biases in 
trade elasticities caused by the absence of appropriate corrections appear to be smaller than those 
measured by HMR. The magnitude of trade elasticities and their range variations across 
countries also turn out to be smaller than the levels found by HMR. 
The option to use panel data with the help of the new excluded variable introduced here 
opens up possibilities for further research on the role of country-level variables in shaping trade 
patterns. We examine two such variables—GDP and Rule of Law—and find that they have 
tangible effects on shaping trade, though not as strong as often found in traditional gravity 
regressions. Our study also casts doubt on the use of some bilateral indicators, such as common 
Religion and Language, proposed as alternative excluded variables. Instead, it points to Ongoing 
Hostility among country dyads as a potential variable that can serve this purpose. These results 
can be very useful in future studies of trade flows and related topics. 
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2.6 Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
 
Name Description Source 
Trade jit Logarithm of exports from country j  to country i at time t in 
thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Robert Feenstra, "UCD-Statistics 
Canada Trade Data, 1980-1997," 
www.internationaldata.org  
Distanceji Logarithm of the great circle distance (in km) between exporter's j and 
importer's i capitals 
Centre D'Etudes Prospectives et 
D'Informations Internationales 
(CEPII)  
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/
cepii/cepii.htm 
Colonialji A binary variable that is unity if exporting country j ever colonized 
importing country i or vice versa. 
Land Borderji A binary variable that is unity if exporter j and importer i share a 
common land border 
Islandji A binary variable that is unity if both exporter j and importer i are 
islands 
CIA The World Factbook  
Landlockedji A binary variable that is unity if both exporting country j and 
importing country i have no direct access to sea 
CIA The World Factbook 
 
CUji A binary variable that is unity if exporting country j and importing 
country i use the same currency 
Rose (2000, 2004) 
FTAji A binary variable that is unity if exporting country j and importing 
country i belong to the same regional trade agreement. 
Rose (2000, 2004) 
Legalji A binary variable that is unity if the exporting country j and importing 
country i share the same legal origin. 
Easterly & Yu 
Languageji A binary variable that is unity if the exporting country j and importing 
country i uses a common language 
CIA The World Factbook 
Religionji (% Protestants in country j  % Protestants in country i)  
+ (% Catholics in country j  %Catholics in country i)  
+ (% Muslims in country j  %Muslims in country i) 
Encyclopedia Britannica Book of 
the Year 2001 
WTOji A vector of two dummy variables: the first binary variable is unity if 
both exporting country j and importing country i do not belong to the 
GATT/WTO; the second binary variable is unity if both countries 
belong to the GATT/WTO 
Rose (2004) and WTO website 
Regulation 
Costs (Percent 
of GDP) ji 
A binary indicator that is unity if the relative cost (as percent of GDP 
per capita) of forming a business is above the median in the exporting 
country j and the importing country i. 
Doing Business Dataset (Djankov 
et al., 2002) 
Regulation 
Costs (Days & 
Procedures) ji 
A binary indicator that is unity if the sum of the number of days and 
procedures to form a business is above the median for both the 
exporting country j and importing country i. 
Doing Business Dataset (Djankov 
et al., 2002) 
Ongoing 
Hostilityjit 
Dichotomous indicator of ongoing hostility between exporting 
country j and the importing country i . 
Correlates of War Database 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
Risk of 
Contract 
Repudiationjt 
A binary variable that takes the value one if contract repudiation in 
country j is less than the median score of all countries, zero otherwise. 
This variable is constructed separately for both exporting country j 
and the importing country i . If the score of a country is less than the 
median it has a higher risk for repudiation of contracts. 
Political Risk Services, Inc., 
ICGR Dataset 
Rule of Lawjt Separate for exporting country j and importing country j.  It "reflects 
the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes." Higher scores imply better political institutions, and a 
strong court system 
Political Risk Services, Inc., 
ICGR Dataset 
GDPjt Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product in thousands of constant 2000 
US dollars. 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
www.worldbank.org/data  
 
 
28 
 
Table 2.2 Baseline Results for the HMR 1986 Reduced-Sample Dataset† 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tji Log Exports from j to i, xjit 
Model Probit  (Marginal Effects) Benchmark Nonlinear LS Polynomial 
Distance (HMR Data) 0.219** 1.173** 0.818** 0.845** 
(0.016) (0.040) (0.056) (0.053) 
Land Border 0.093 0.612** 0.861** 0.841** 
(0.072) (0.165) (0.141) (0.166) 
Island 0.170** 0.566* 0.442** 0.193 
(0.048) (0.274) (0.056) (0.268) 
Landlocked 0.058 0.431* 0.849** 0.352+ 
(0.046) (0.189) (0.189) (0.187) 
Legal 0.0540** 0.551** 0.041 0.443** 
(0.019) (0.064) (0.074) (0.064) 
Language 0.0987** 0.126+ 0.186 0.032 
(0.021) (0.075) (0.234) (0.077) 
Colonial Ties 0.009 0.907** 0.335* 0.842** 
(0.131) (0.157) (0.171) (0.148) 
Currency Union 0.222** 1.532** 1.075** 1.138** 
(0.039) (0.334) (0.286) (0.333) 
FTA 0.357** 0.968** 0.127 0.228 
(0.009) (0.246) (0.240) (0.198) 
Religion 0.147** 0.295* 0.121 0.137 
(0.034) (0.119) (0.113) (0.119) 
Regulation Costs  
(Percent of GDP) 
0.108** 0.146   
(0.036) (0.100)   
Regulation Costs  
(Days & Procedures) 
0.068* 0.226+   
(0.031) (0.124)   
 (from )   0.635**  
  (0.109)  
   0.256
* 0.835** 
  (0.101) (0.204) 
    3.162
** 
   (0.519) 
    0.674** 
   (0.161) 
    0.0562
** 
   (0.016) 
Observations 12420 6645 6645 6645 
R2 . 0.693 0.700 0.701 
† Regressions include exporter and importer fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.  
+ 10% significance level, * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
*ˆ
ijw
*ˆ
ij
*ˆ
ijz
2*ˆ
ijz
3*ˆ
ijz
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Table 2.3 Result of Estimation with HMR 1986 Reduced-Sample Dataset,  
Using an Alternative Distance Variable† 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tji Log Exports from j to i, xjit 
Model Probit  (Marginal Effects) Benchmark Nonlinear LS Polynomial 
Log of the Great Circle 
Distance  
0.217** 1.181** 0.828** 0.875** 
(0.017) (0.040) (0.056) (0.051) 
Land Border 0.097 0.499** 0.737** 0.695** 
(0.077) (0.157) (0.143) (0.157) 
Island 0.175** 0.665* 0.433** 0.282 
(0.047) (0.271) (0.056) (0.261) 
Landlocked 0.052 0.422* 0.872** 0.366* 
(0.046) (0.186) (0.190) (0.183) 
Legal 0.0570** 0.546** 0.047 0.438** 
(0.019) (0.064) (0.075) (0.064) 
Language 0.104** 0.136+ 0.258 0.029 
(0.021) (0.076) (0.235) (0.078) 
Colonial Ties 0.022 0.909** 0.342* 0.855** 
(0.131) (0.159) (0.171) (0.151) 
Currency Union 0.202** 1.417** 0.987** 1.062** 
(0.044) (0.337) (0.286) (0.338) 
FTA 0.357** 1.024** 0.133 0.304 
(0.009) (0.243) (0.244) (0.198) 
Religion 0.155** 0.397** 0.201* 0.231+ 
(0.034) (0.119) (0.113) (0.119) 
Regulation Costs  
(Percent of GDP) 
0.109** 0.207*     
(0.036) (0.100)   
Regulation Costs  
(Days & Procedures) 
0.0675* 0.231+     
(0.031) (0.124)   
 (from )     0.621**   
  (0.110)  
     0.193
* 0.770** 
  (0.089) (0.205) 
       2.935
** 
   (0.518) 
       0.594** 
   (0.161) 
       0.0463
** 
   (0.016) 
Observations 12420 6645 6645 6645 
R2 . 0.693 0.699 0.700 
† Regressions include exporter and importer fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.  
+ 10% significance level, * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
*ˆ
ijw
*ˆ
ij
*ˆ
ijz
2*ˆ
ijz
3*ˆ
ijz
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Table 2.4 Estimation Results of the HMR Model with the Revised 1986 Dataset† 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tji Log Exports from j to i, xjit 
Model Probit  (Marginal Effects) Benchmark Nonlinear LS Polynomial 
Log of the Great Circle 
Distance  
0.275** 1.232** 0.796** 0.890** 
(0.014) (0.036) (0.056) (0.051) 
Land Border 0.167** 0.398** 0.754** 0.672** 
(0.055) (0.149) (0.134) (0.152) 
Island 0.162** 0.330+ 0.338** 0.034 
(0.041) (0.175) (0.050) (0.169) 
Landlocked 0.104* 0.422* 1.159** 0.309 
(0.046) (0.193) (0.168) (0.192) 
Legal 0.0408** 0.432** 0.089* 0.338** 
(0.016) (0.056) (0.066) (0.056) 
Language 0.0922** 0.232** 0.009 0.109 
(0.019) (0.068) (0.158) (0.069) 
Colonial Ties 0.044 1.135** 0.263* 1.118** 
(0.111) (0.151) (0.169) (0.144) 
Currency Union 0.181** 1.125** 0.774** 0.873** 
(0.054) (0.295) (0.254) (0.291) 
FTA 0.433** 0.688** 0.371* 0.515** 
(0.033) (0.214) (0.176) (0.171) 
Religion 0.133** 0.404** 0.279** 0.341** 
(0.028) (0.102) (0.097) (0.101) 
Regulation Costs  
(Percent of GDP) 
0.0814** 0.215*   
(0.029) (0.097)   
Regulation Costs  
(Days & Procedures) 
0.002 0.010   
(0.025) (0.086)   
 (from )   0.71**  
  (0.097)  
   0.256
** 0.903** 
  (0.087) (0.170) 
    3.001
** 
   (0.446) 
    0.585** 
   (0.140) 
    0.0431
** 
   (0.014) 
Observations 18487 8776 8776 8776 
R2 . 0.686 0.693 0.696 
† Regressions include exporter and importer fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.  
+ 10% significance level, * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
*ˆ
ijw
*ˆ
ij
*ˆ
ijz
2*ˆ
ijz
3*ˆ
ijz
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Table 2.5 Estimates of the HMR Model with Alternative Specification and Pooled Panel Data† 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tji Log Exports from j to i, xjit 
Model: Probit  (Marginal Effects) Benchmark Nonlinear LS Polynomial 
Log of the Great Circle 
Distance  
0.188** 1.358** 1.035** 1.037** 
(0.006) (0.024) (0.037) (0.039) 
Land Border 0.176** 0.356** 0.640** 0.622** 
(0.030) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
Island 0.013 0.261+ 0.227+ 0.251+ 
(0.024) (0.139) (0.137) (0.136) 
Landlocked 0.0707** 0.487** 0.367** 0.396** 
(0.019) (0.132) (0.131) (0.130) 
Legal 0.0287** 0.201** 0.151** 0.145** 
(0.007) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Language 0.0447** 0.321** 0.230** 0.228** 
(0.008) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
Colonial Ties 0.035 0.982** 0.877** 0.837** 
(0.039) (0.123) (0.118) (0.117) 
Currency Union 0.107** 1.044** 0.795** 0.792** 
(0.021) (0.254) (0.257) (0.259) 
FTA 0.158** 0.534** 0.460** 0.568** 
(0.028) (0.133) (0.115) (0.112) 
Religion 0.160** 0.572** 0.316** 0.323** 
(0.013) (0.066) (0.069) (0.070) 
Log of Exporter GDP 0.0444** 0.483** 0.396** 0.390** 
(0.006) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Log of Importer GDP 0.0607** 0.450** 0.342** 0.343** 
(0.006) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Exporter Rule of Law 0.0156** 0.0555** 0.023* 0.0194+ 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Importer Rule of Law 0.004 0.0434** 0.036** 0.0343** 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ongoing Hostility 0.295** 0.871** 0.451* 0.470* 
 (0.066) (0.213) (0.219) (0.222) 
Exporter Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.00876* 0.0066   
(0.004) (0.019)   
Importer Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.004 0.0734** 0.0797** 0.0779** 
(0.005) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 (from )   0.476**  
  (0.080)  
   0.045
* 0.723** 
  (0.074) (0.121) 
    3.370
** 
   (0.319) 
    0.749** 
   (0.099) 
    0.0615
** 
   (0.010) 
Observations 175309 103196 103196 103196 
R2 . 0.687 0.690 0.692 
† Regressions include time as well as exporter and importer fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.   
+ 10% significance level    * 5% significance level    ** 1% significance level 
*ˆ
ijw
*ˆ
ij
*ˆ
ijz
2*ˆ
ijz
3*ˆ
ijz
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Table 2.6 Panel Estimation of the Alternative Specification HMR Model with Random Effects† 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tji Log Exports from j to i, xjit 
Model: Pooled Panel Logit 
Random Effect 
Logit Benchmark Polynomial 
Log of the Great Circle Distance  1.044** 1.335** 1.280** 1.228** 
(0.0145) (0.035) (0.023) (0.023) 
Land Border 0.866** 1.050** 0.467** 0.493** 
(0.0565) (0.137) (0.096) (0.094) 
Island 0.0541 0.143 0.183 0.221+ 
(0.0692) (0.180) (0.124) (0.121) 
Landlocked 0.373** 0.504** 0.423** 0.447** 
(0.0725) (0.170) (0.138) (0.135) 
Legal 0.174** 0.199** 0.194** 0.168** 
(0.0175) (0.044) (0.034) (0.033) 
Language 0.231** 0.363** 0.309** 0.304** 
(0.0245) (0.061) (0.046) (0.045) 
Colonial Ties 0.162 0.474 1.127** 1.017** 
(0.173) (0.349) (0.117) (0.114) 
Currency Union 0.657** 0.831** 0.904** 0.905** 
(0.0838) (0.211) (0.176) (0.173) 
FTA 1.222** 0.375 0.083+ 0.167** 
(0.146) (0.255) (0.050) (0.050) 
Religion 0.833** 1.088** 0.576** 0.547** 
(0.0365) (0.089) (0.064) (0.063) 
Log of Exporter GDP 0.244** 0.309** 0.453** 0.423** 
(0.0263) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) 
Log of Importer GDP 0.332** 0.418** 0.491** 0.457** 
(0.0266) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013) 
Exporter Rule of Law 0.0813** 0.103** 0.0786** 0.0610** 
(0.0116) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) 
Importer Rule of Law 0.0159 0.019 0.0634** 0.0604** 
(0.0117) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ongoing Hostility 1.402** 1.103** 0.265** 0.085 
(0.202) (0.270) (0.009) (0.112) 
Exporter Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.0546* 0.0610* 0.00048  
(0.0222) (0.026) (0.011)  
Importer Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.0239 0.031 0.0515** 0.0517** 
(0.0227) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) 
    0.418
** 
   (0.027) 
    0.831
** 
   (0.099) 
    0.171** 
   (0.032) 
    0.0159
** 
   (0.003) 
Observations 175309 189592 117479 117479 
R2  . . . 
† Regressions include time as well as exporter and importer fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors.   
+ 10% significance level    * 5% significance level    ** 1% significance level 
*ˆ
ij
*ˆ
ijz
2*ˆ
ijz
3*ˆ
ijz
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Table 2.7 Fixed-Effect Panel Estimates of the Probability of Trade Equation† 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tji 
Method: Fixed Effect Logit 
Fixed Effect 
Logit 
Fixed Effect 
Logit 
Log of Exporter GDP 0.319** 0.318** 0.325*** 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Log of Importer GDP  0.422** 0.422** 0.415*** 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Exporter Rule of Law  0.105** 0.105** 0.110*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Importer Rule of Law  0.021 0.020 0.013 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Ongoing Hostility 0.922** 0.920** 0.920*** 
(0.313) (0.313) (0.313) 
Exporter Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.0560* 0.028  
(0.026) (0.033)  
Importer Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.028 0.0586+  
(0.026) (0.034)  
Interaction of Exporter/Importer 
Risk of Contract Repudiation 
 0.056 0.037 
 (0.041) (0.027) 
Observations 90356 90356 90356 
Number of directed dyads    
 
† Regressions include time and dyad fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors.  
+ 10% significance level,  * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
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Table 2.8 1982-1997 Fixed-Effect Panel Estimates† 
Dependent Variable: Log Exports from j of i, xjit 
Model: Benchmark Polynomial Firm Heterogeneity 
Heckman 
Selection 
Log of Exporter GDP 0.450** 0.350** 0.303** 0.429** 
(0.028) (0.039) (0.017) (0.014) 
Log of Importer GDP 0.494** 0.371** 0.330** 0.496** 
(0.025) (0.049) (0.018) (0.014) 
Exporter Rule of Law 0.0821** 0.0494** 0.0509** 0.0945** 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005) 
Importer Rule of Law 0.0661** 0.0637** 0.0640** 0.0715** 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ongoing Hostility 0.253* 0.072 0.162+ 0.272** 
(0.119) (0.153) (0.095) (0.090) 
Exporter Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.00002    
(0.017)    
Importer Risk of Contract 
Repudiation 
0.0467** 0.0495** 0.0532** 0.0411** 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
  0.199
+  0.407** 
 (0.116)  (0.028) 
  0.480
** 0.392**  
 (0.115) (0.027)  
  0.0159**   
 (0.002)   
  0.000236
**   
 (0.000)   
Observations 117479 117479 117479 117479 
R2 0.124 0.127 0.126 0.126 
 
 † Regressions include time and dyad fixed effects not shown in this table. The numbers in parentheses 
are standard      errors.  
+ 10% significance level, * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
*ˆ
ij
*ˆ
ijz
2*ˆ
ijz
3*ˆ
ijz
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Table 2.9 Determinants of Directed-Dyad Fixed Effects in Gravity Equation† 
Dependent Variable: Directed-Dyad Fixed Effect, Xji Benchmark 
Directed-Dyad Fixed Effect, Xji 
Polynomial 
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Log of the Great Circle Distance  1.292** 1.290** 1.008** 1.003** 
(0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0256) (0.0259) 
Land Border 0.523** 0.513** 0.705** 0.695** 
(0.115) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) 
Island 0.158 0.161 0.177 0.178 
(0.121) (0.122) (0.119) (0.120) 
Landlocked 0.390** 0.417** 0.353** 0.375** 
(0.127) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128) 
Legal 0.189** 0.187** 0.120** 0.118** 
(0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0358) (0.0358) 
Language 0.344** 0.308** 0.314** 0.283** 
(0.0490) (0.0490) (0.0481) (0.0480) 
Colonial Ties 1.105** 1.125** 0.922** 0.942** 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) 
Currency Union††  1.056**  0.922** 
 (0.220)  (0.225) 
FTA††  0.304  0.187 
 (0.194)  (0.188) 
Religion 0.551** 0.574** 0.375** 0.395** 
(0.0659) (0.0658) (0.0650) (0.0650) 
Observations 11833 11833 11833 11833 
R2 0.634 0.635 0.487 0.488 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   
††  These variables are set equal to 1 if the exporter and importer belong to the FTA or Currency Union 
for at least 5 years in the 1980s. 
+ 10% significance level, * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
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Table 2.10 Trade Elasticity Responses to Distance Reduction Across Country Dyads 
Country pairs group 
Number of Country 
Dyads 
Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Distance 
Mean         S.D.          Min         Max 
  Pooled Panel Regressions 
North-North 2141 1.184         0.205        1.037       2.324 
North-South  32799 1.531         0.328        1.037       2.644 
South-South 68256 1.985         0.365        1.037       2.717 
Overall 103196 1.824         0.420        1.037       2.717 
  Random Effect Regressions 
North-North 4283 1.237         0.059        1.228       1.973 
North-South  44940 1.340         0.199        1.228       2.219 
South-South 68256 1.685         0.283        1.228       2.246 
Overall 117479 1.537         0.305        1.228       2.246 
 
 
` 
37 
 
CHAPTER 3 
HOW THE OIL FLOWS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Oil prices play a major role in the world economy. In particular, fluctuations in oil prices 
in the past four decades have contributed to significant economic instability in many countries. It 
is well understood that these fluctuations depend on the elasticities of oil demand in importing 
countries and on the behavior of oil exporting countries (Hamilton, 2008 and 2009). However, 
far less attention has been paid to factors that determine oil trade, which also influence the cost 
of oil for each country. Such costs and their variability in turn influence the policies in countries 
toward domestic energy prices as well as the efforts to develop alternative sources of energy. 
This paper makes an effort to fill the gap in research on oil trade patterns around the world. We 
use the approach developed Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), HMR hereafter, to specify 
and estimate a model of bilateral oil trade. We employ the estimation results to analyze the role 
of various factors in the formation of partnerships and bilateral flows in oil trade. We examine 
how these factors affect the cost of oil for each country and their ultimate impact on world prices 
and trade pattern. 
The HMR approach addresses a number of important concerns in estimating the equation 
for bilateral trade flows often encountered in the standard gravity framework. One such concern 
is the large number of zeros among country dyads. Focusing on the sample of bilateral 
relationships with positive trade poses a selection problem. In addition, the elasticity of oil 
supply with respect to various factors depends on how oil producers respond as the prices they 
face change. Oil exporting countries with very heterogeneous oil sources may face rapidly rising 
costs if they try to expand production and exports, while those with more homogenous oil 
sources may be able to respond with larger changes in trade volumes. The HMR framework 
allows us to deal with both selection and heterogeneity issues and explain both partnerships as 
well as trade flows. 
HMR develop a theoretical model of international trade with heterogeneous firms from 
which they derive two equations: one determining the formation of partnerships and the other 
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trade volumes for the formed partnerships. Their empirical results show that ignoring the 
unobserved firm heterogeneity and selection effects causes an upward bias in standard 
estimations of gravity model. The results we obtain by estimating the equation with dyadic panel 
data of oil trade flows for 1980-2000 also provide support for their argument in the case of 
international oil market. We observe that ignoring the selection and heterogeneity effects in oil 
trade causes significant biases in the estimated trade elasticities. 
Oil well productivity varies greatly among and within countries. Table 3.1 illustrates the 
heterogeneity of oil fields throughout the world and also shows the diverse nature of oil fields 
within each country and even region (Simmons, 2002). Top 250 most productive wells in Utah 
and the amount they produce are shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.  They illustrate that even 
within the boundaries of a state, oil wells can be quite heterogeneous with significantly different 
productivities. Although there is no full dataset for the productivity of all oil wells at country 
level, these figures and tables give a glimpse of the extent of heterogeneity within one country. 
The extent of such heterogeneity determines the elasticity of supply from each oil-exporting 
country. Even though we don’t have data across countries to directly measure variations in 
heterogeneity, HMR method offers an indirect way of gauging heterogeneity of productivity of 
sources within each country. 
The selection effect is more closely tied to the average productivity of oil wells in each 
country. An oil producing country can end up exporting oil if the productivity of some of its oil 
fields is large enough to overcome the costs of trade. The higher the average productivity, the 
greater is the number of fields that can potentially export. A simple corroboration of this point 
can be seen in Table 3.2, which shows the average oil well productivity in some of the oil 
producing countries along with the corresponding number of oil wells and export/production 
data. The highest productive oil wells are located in Saudi Arabia followed by Norway. Among 
the major oil producing countries the lowest well productivity can be found in USA with the 
highest number of oil wells by far. Since the total production of oil is found by multiplying oil 
well productivity by the number of oil wells, higher production does not necessarily mean that 
country is more productive in producing oil. In fact, the correlation of oil production and oil well 
productivity is 0.49. For example, United States is ranked as 3rd in total oil production and but is 
ranked as 40th in average oil well productivity. Venezuela is ranked as 7th in oil production but is 
ranked as 21th in average well productivity. More systematic support for this point comes from 
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the regression of oil exports on total production and average oil well productivity across oil 
exporting countries. (See Table 3.3.) Both variables prove statistically and economically 
significant, jointly explaining 82 percent of the variation in oil export. Notably, they display 
equal explanatory powers, indicating that oil well productivity is as important as total production 
in explaining exports. If in a country total production is kept constant and 10 percent more oil is 
produced out of 10 percent fewer wells, exports goes up by 6.3 percent at the mean, very close to 
the increase in exports if total production goes up 10 percent through expansion in the number of 
wells. This result is in line with Melitz (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms in which 
he associates the exports of a country with the productivity of its firms. This same effect is 
present in HMR: the more productive the firms in a country, the more likely that they are able to 
cover the fixed costs of exporting. With firm heterogeneity the model can explain zero and 
asymmetric trade flows between countries.  
A critical aspect of HMR structural model is that its estimation requires a variable that 
affects the probability of trade but is uncorrelated with the residual of the trade volume equation. 
Factors that affect fixed costs of trade but have no impact on variable trade costs satisfy this 
exclusion restriction. For our estimation, we need a valid excluded variable that works in a panel 
setting. In an earlier study of trade flow for all products (Ergul and Esfahani, 2010), we find that 
Ongoing Hostility between an exporting and importing country serve such a purpose, affecting 
fixed costs, but not variable costs, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. In this study, we 
show that this variable plays a similar role in crude oil trade. As an additional support for our 
argument, we also present the results obtained by using an alternative and valid excluded 
variable, Contract Repudiation Index. The two methods yield very similar results. Moreover, we 
carry out the chi-squared test for overidentification and conclude that both excluded variables are 
uncorrelated with second stage residuals. 1  
We use the econometric estimation results to simulate a model of global oil trade and 
explore the outcome of possible scenarios of conflicts and a war-like situation which causes 
higher transportation costs for the oil exporters of Middle East. One of our experiments is 
increasing the hostilities between Iran and a group of countries which result in a change in trade 
                                                 
1 We obtain 1.506 as our test statistic with a probability value of 0.22. So, we don’t reject the hypothesis that both 
variables are uncorrelated with second stage residuals. 
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patterns of some of the countries in the group as they stop trading with Iran. A more radical one 
is putting an embargo against Iranian oil by the same group of countries, which has more severe 
impact on oil prices in the world. If Iran retaliates by blocking the oil routes around the Persian 
Gulf that would cause an increase in transportation costs of the oil export out of that region and 
the situation would deteriorate more. In each situation we try to identify the emerging trade 
patterns and the way the added conflicts affects the crude oil prices and oil expenditures of 
importing countries. Finally, we use our model to make projections for ten year ahead, from year 
1997 to 2007, and compare our projections with the actual change in world crude oil prices in 
that time frame. The results confirm that our model is able to predict actual values quite well.  
In section 3.2 we present a modified version of the HMR model, which we employ in our 
estimation. We then describe the data and discuss the regression results in sections 3.3 and 3.4, 
respectively. In section 3.5, we present our simulation experiments. Section 3.6 concludes the 
paper.  
3.2 Description of the Model  
For estimating the elasticities of oil trade, we rely on the HMR model. For our purposes, 
it is sufficient to describe the main equations determining trade probabilities and trade flows, 
adapted to a panel setting. HMR show that the probability of formation of a partnership between 
exporter j and importer i is related to  
(1) zjit = 0  cjt + (1)(jit + aL  pit) + yit  fjit + ujit ,  
where 0 is a constant and ujit ~ N(0, u2) is a random factor affecting the profits of exporting 
from j to i at time t. The other variables are defined as follows: 
: the elasticity of substitution among oil varieties (oil from different sources),  
cjt: log of average unit cost of production of oil in country j at time t,  
jit: log of unit trade costs of exporting oil from j to i at time t,  
aL: productivity of the most efficient production station, 
pit: log of the average price of oil in country i at time t, 
yit: log of total expenditure on oil in country i at time t, 
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fjit: log of the fixed costs of exporting oil from j to i at time t. 
The fixed costs have a number of components. Specifically, fjit xxjt + mmit + jit  
vjit, where vjit is a random factor distributed as N(0, v2), 's are parameters, mit is a fixed trade 
barrier imposed by the oil importing country on all oil exporters at time t, xjt is a measure of 
fixed export costs common across all export destinations at time t, and jit is a measure of any 
additional country-pair specific fixed trade costs. These fixed cost components may be further 
decomposed into time-variant and time-invariant components.  
 Given the above specification, the composite random element in (1) will be jit = vjit + ujit, 
where jit ~ N(0, 2) and 2 = u2 + v2. Using Tjit as a dichotomous indicator of trade, the 
probability that country j exports to country i at time t (Tjit = 1) can be expressed as: 
(2)  Pr(Tjit=1| observables) = [

1 (0  cjt  (1)(jit + aL  pit) + yit  xxjt  mmit  jit)], 
where  is cdf of unit-normal distribution.  
The volume of exports from country j to country i when there is a partnership forms a 
gravity-type equation, which can be expressed in log-linear form as: 
(3) x jit = 0  (1)cjt + njt  (1)( jit  pit ) + yit + wjit + ujit,  
where 0 is a constant, njt is the log of number of oil production stations in the exporting country, 
and wjit is the heterogeneity factor of oil production stations that export from j to i. The key 
difference between this equation and the standard gravity model is the heterogeneity effect of oil 
production stations, wjit. This term need not be symmetric with respect to the direction of trade. 
Its value is determined by the marginal profitability of exporting from j to i. Since the 
determinants of volume of trade are also related to marginal profitability, their coefficients are 
likely to be biased if wjit is left out. Another source of bias is the selection problem due to higher 
values of ujit among dyads that become trade partners, which causes a correlation between this 
term and the factors affecting profitability of trade included on the right-hand side of the 
equation (Heckman 1979).  
 HMR show that wjit can be derived as a monotonic function of zjit: When zjit > 0, wjit = 
ln[exp(zjit) 1], where  is a positive parameter. This relationship provides a means of 
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estimating wjit based on the estimate of zjit from equation (2), . Equation (2) also offers a way 
of dealing with the selection bias caused by the fact that ujit is truncated. Given the estimate of 
jit from (2), we have E[ujit | ., Tjit = 1] = βuη , where βuη ≡ corr (ujit, ujit)(σu/ση) and = 
E[jit/ση| ., Tjit = 1]. With these considerations in mind, the trade volume equation becomes: 
(4) x jit = 0  ( 1)cjt + njt  ( 1)( jit  pit ) + yit + ln[exp( )  1]  +βuη +  ejit, 
where ejit is i.i.d. Note that the term containing  is nonlinear, which complicates the 
estimation procedure a bit. To facilitate estimation, HMR use a Taylor expansion of the 
nonlinear term and find that the results are largely unaffected. We follow their procedure and 
replace the nonlinear term with a quadratic polynomial of . 
The crucial issue in the estimation of the system of equations (2) and (4) is that except the 
fixed-cost factors, all the variables determining *ˆ jitz  and 
*ˆ
jit  are included on the right-hand side 
of (4). As a result, finding variables that represent only the fixed costs and, thus, can be excluded 
from (4) is crucial in making it possible to identify the heterogeneity and selection effects in the 
trade volume equation. In the next section, we discuss this choice along with the description of 
our data.  
3.3 Data  
The dataset that we use is an unbalanced panel that covers 26,082 directed dyads 
involving 162 countries during 1980-2000. However, due to missing data points, we end up with 
a total of 278,761 observations that have complete information, amounting to an average of 
about 11 years of data per directed dyad. Since about 37 percent of the countries in our dataset 
do not export any oil, we end up with 175,206 observations that can be used in estimations. The 
data sources and the variables used in our empirical analysis are described in Table 3.4.  
In our regressions, we include the log of oil production (in US dollars) for exporting 
countries to account for the number of production units and their average productivity, serving as 
a proxy for njt  ( 1)cjt. We also include the log of oil expenditure (in US dollars) for importing 
countries as a measure of yit. Since there may be concerns about endogeneity of these variables, 
we use their lagged values as instruments. As indicators of trade costs, jit, we use Distance, 
*ˆ
jitz
*ˆ
jit *ˆ jit
*ˆ
jitz
*ˆ
jit
*ˆ
jitz
*ˆ
jitz
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Contiguity, shared Legal system, Colonial ties, shared Religions, shared dominant Language, and 
Ongoing Hostility. Since the contemporaneous value of Ongoing Hostility may be affected by 
the trade relations, we use its lagged value as an explanatory variable. Following HMR, we also 
include indicators showing whether or not both countries are Landlocked or Islands.2 We employ 
time fixed effects to take account of global shocks and exporter and importer fixed effects to 
account for the time invariant unobserved country characteristics. 
In order to take account of the selection and heterogeneity effects, we use Ongoing 
Hostility between a dyad as the excluded variable. High levels of hostility between two countries 
certainly discourage trade between them. However, once the countries overcome their hostility 
barrier and begin to trade, the level of hostility may not have a major effect on the volume of 
trade. We have found empirical support for this claim in our study of aggregate trade 
partnerships and flows (Ergul and Esfahani, 2010). Our estimation results here for the oil market 
again confirm that Ongoing Hostility significantly and negatively affects the probability of 
partnership formation in oil trade, but once a partnership forms, the role of hostility proves 
insignificant in determining the volume of trade. We repeat this estimation with an alternative 
excluded variable, Contract Repudiation Index, which should theoretically be a valid one, as we 
argue and empirically support it in Ergul and Esfahani (2010). This index is constructed by 
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995), using International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset 
of the Political Risk Services, Inc., defined as an indicator that "addresses the possibility that 
foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants face the risk of a modification in a contract 
taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down due to an income drop, budget 
cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government economic 
and social priorities." Such risks, and the efforts to overcome them, should have a major effect 
on the fixed costs of setting up production and arranging exports, but not necessarily the variable 
costs. Since Contract Repudiation is country specific, rather being dyad specific, we include the 
indicators for the exporter and importer separately in the equation. These could be viewed as 
representing xjt and mit. We also interact these two variables for each dyad to form a proxy for 
jit, the same way that HMR handle the Regulation Cost indicators. To the extent that these 
                                                 
2 We also experimented with many other variables that are commonly employed as determinants of trade costs in 
gravity models (e.g., such as common membership in a free trade area, currency union, or the GATT/WTO). These 
variables did not prove significant in our regressions. 
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variables affect only the fixed cost of trade, they should appear with significant negative 
coefficients in equation (2), but not in equation (4). It is, of course, possible that they may have 
significant coefficients in the gravity equation as well, or prove insignificant in both or have the 
wrong signs. These are issues that ultimately need to be settled empirically. 
For estimation with Contract Repudiation, the total number of observations drops to 
105,932 due to limited availability of ICRG data, which only covers 15,500 directed dyads 
involving 125 countries during 1982-1997.  
3.4 Estimation Results  
We start with the regressions that use the Contract Repudiation indices for the exporter 
and the importer as potential excluded variables (see Table 3.5). The first column shows the 
estimates for the probability of trade equation. The second column is the benchmark estimate for 
the trade volume equation, without controls for selection and heterogeneity. The third column is 
the estimate of the polynomial version of equation (4). First, note that the importer Contract 
Repudiation is a significant variable in determining the probability of trade, but is not 
significantly associated with the volume of trade shown in column 2. This indicates that the 
importer Contract Repudiation tends to impose a fixed cost on selling oil in a country, but once 
the importer overcomes the hurdle, that institutional weakness has little tangible effect on the 
marginal cost of imports. As a result, this variable can serve as an excluded variable with 
reasonable theoretical and empirical backing. The exporter Contract Repudiation turns out to be 
insignificant in all regressions. This is in contrast with our finding in Ergul and Esfahani (2010) 
regarding the role of this variable in aggregate trade. This contrasting outcome in the case of oil 
trade seems sensible because oil exporting firms are typically owned by governments that 
internalize the costs of contract repudiation and try to mitigate its impact on their oil exports. In 
contrast, the import side is dominated by foreign or private domestic companies that face fixed 
costs affected by reliability problems at wholesale or distribution outlets. 
Next, note that all three regressions yield significant coefficient estimate for most 
variables with reasonable signs. Oil production of the exporting country, oil expenditure of the 
importing country, Distance between the two countries, Common Religion, Legal System, and 
Colonial Ties are significant at reasonable levels with expected signs and magnitudes compared 
to other gravity studies. Furthermore, the selection and heterogeneity terms all display high 
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levels of significance. These estimates show that the regressions are meaningful and can produce 
useful results.  
A particularly notable result in Table 3.5 is that Ongoing Hostility within the dyad is 
significant in the trade partnership equation with expected signs, but proves insignificant in the 
benchmark equation and remains so when we control for biases using importer Contract 
Repudiation as the excluded variable. This result conform with Morrow’s (1999) conclusion that 
the probability of conflict may impose a fixed costs on trade within the dyad, but once that cost 
is paid, there is not any additional cost of conflict affecting the volume of trade. These 
observations suggest that Ongoing Hostility may serve as an alternative excluded variables. 
Table 3.6 shows the results of pursuing this idea.  
Using Ongoing Hostility alone as a determinant of fixed cost of trade and the excluded 
variable in the trade volume equation allows us to work with approximately 75 percent more 
observations (see Table 3.6). The coefficients are similar to those obtained in Table 3.5, but they 
are estimated more accurately. Therefore, in the rest of this paper we will focus on these results 
and discuss their implications.  
The elasticity of trade volume with respect to production is marginally smaller than one, 
indicating that a large part of increased production gets exported to existing customers, with a 
smaller part being either exported to new customers or consumed domestically. The domestic use 
of the additional production may be because of increased consumption induced by higher 
incomes from oil. Expenditure elasticity in importing countries is more visibly less than one, 
suggesting that importers try to diversify their sources and possibly raise domestic production as 
their consumption rises. These elasticity estimates are very close to income elasticity estimates 
0.8-0.9 of Rose (2000 and 2004) using product of two trading partners’ GDP’s. Our results are 
also in the range of estimates of Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001). Their income elasticity 
estimate for exporting country is in the range of 0.44-1.15 and 0.62-0.86 for importing country 
depending on whether the good is differentiated or homogenous.  
The absolute value of the elasticity of trade with respect to distance turns out to be 
somewhat greater than one. This is again quite close to Rose’s (2000 and 2004) estimates for the 
distance elasticity of aggregate trade, which is in the range of -1.09 to -1.31. Similarly, Glick and 
Taylor (2010) obtain -1.2. HMR find a lower elasticity, -0.847, after correcting for selection and 
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heterogeneity biases. Comparing this result with our estimate for oil trade, we conclude that 
Distance may be playing a relatively more important role in the oil market than in the typical 
traded product. This highlights the important role of distance and helps explain why most 
countries tend to buy oil from nearby sources. 
We also compare our results to Helmers and Pasteels (2005) since they estimate a gravity 
model with disaggregated trade flows one of which is petroleum industry. Their right hand side 
variables include neither production and expenditure nor controls for income of trading partners. 
Instead they use exporting and importing country fixed effects and with cross section data fixed 
effects absorb the effect of those variables. Their distance coefficient turns out to be very close to 
ours. But they find significant effect of conflict on trade levels.  
Nugent and Yousef (2005) disaggregate data into energy (oil-gas) and non-energy sub-
groups. Their distance elasticity of oil and gas flows is at odds with existing literature. It display 
high significance but with a positive coefficient, which is found to be 2.01. They add squared 
distance to their estimates which is negative, significant and quite small, -0.097. Their income 
elasticity estimates using product of two trading partners’ GDP’s ranges between 0.337-0.454. 
Similar to our results, Common Language is insignificant and Colonial Ties is significant in 
explaining oil and gas trade though with a much greater coefficient estimate than ours and the 
existing literature. 
 One important question regarding the results is the magnitude and direction of bias due 
to selection and heterogeneity effects. Table 3.7 presents the results of introducing the variables 
representing the two effects separately, along with the benchmark and full model estimates. Note 
that in the absence of any type of bias correction, the estimated coefficients of oil production, oil 
expenditure and distance are 0.697, 0.560 and –1.066, respectively. They go down sharply when 
only heterogeneity bias is corrected, and they go up sharply when only the selection bias is 
corrected. When both corrections are made, the estimated coefficients end up at 0.902, 0.834, 
and –1.244 respectively. A similar pattern can be seen in the coefficients of other significant 
variables. These observations suggest that in the absence of corrections, selection causes a 
downward bias and heterogeneity causes an upward bias in the coefficients.  
The direction of the selection bias is easy to understand: Many unobserved factors that 
make it more profitable for trade partnerships to form help add some observations to the trade 
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volume sample that would not otherwise be present based on their observed characteristics. As a 
result, the effects of the observed characteristics appear as weaker than they actually are; i.e., 
their coefficient estimates are downward biased. In the case of oil trade such biases seem to be 
quite strong for most of the variables included in the regression (compare the first and last 
columns of Table 3.7). To understand the role of heterogeneity in biasing the standard gravity 
regressions, note that when the productivities of oil production stations are very diverse, it is 
more likely that there are some with export potential. Such units will have lower marginal cost of 
production and, therefore, are likely to export large amounts as trade costs decline. Without 
appropriate controls for heterogeneity, the entire response of trade may be attributed to factors 
included in the regression, thus over-estimating their impact on trade. This can account for the 
sharp drop in elasticities when we control for heterogeneity. Our results show that both biases are 
large. However, the overall downward bias indicates that the selection bias strongly dominates 
the heterogeneity effect of oil production stations.  
3.5 Simulations 
3.5.1 The Setup 
In order to assess the performance of our model and to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
results, we carry out a number of simulations by placing the estimated equations in a global 
equilibrium context. We use our empirical results and HMR’s theoretical model to calculate 
probabilities of trade partnership, trade volumes, prices, and production and consumption levels 
for all dyads with available data. For our base period, we focus on the average of the data over 
the 1995-1997 period. We allow the average cost of oil production in a country, cjt, to adjust and 
shifts its export prices up and down to equilibrate total demand for the country’s oil with its 
production. This is done by adjusting the exporter fixed effects. The aggregate effect of price 
increases for oil from different sources (derived from a Dixit-Stigliz model of differentiated 
products) can then be turned into an adjustment term in the importer fixed effect in the 
probability of trade equation,  (1)pit /. We assume that the elasticity of substitution among 
oil varieties is high and set  = 11, which is in range often found in the study of substitution 
elasticities among varieties of the same product. (The results are not very sensitive to changes in 
 within a reasonable range around this value.) As an estimate of , we use the inverse of the 
coefficient of log of expenditure in the Probit regression,  = 1/0.0838.  
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Building a simulation model based on the regression results poses a number of additional 
challenges and requires important assumptions and modeling choices. The first problem to 
address is the calculation of own use of oil for oil-producing countries. The estimation results 
provide us with trade relationships, but not with own use of oil. We assume that own use is 
basically trade with the country itself and form the bilateral coefficients and measure trade 
volume accordingly. However, own trade may entail effects not captured in bilateral trade 
models. For this purpose, we calculate own-use fixed effects as an adjustment to the price for 
domestic use such that for each oil producer, the volume of internal trade derived from the model 
becomes equal to the actual use in the base period.  
The second challenge is to deal with the missing values. There is inadequate data for 37 
out of 162 countries. Fortunately, these are all relatively small countries with very small potential 
production or consumption compared to the rest of the world. For the remaining 125, there are 
some missing expenditure and fixed effect data. In particular, we do not obtain importer fixed 
effects for oil exporters that do not import from any other country. Since it is theoretically 
possible that these countries may start importing from other countries under some scenarios, we 
need their importer fixed effects for the simulation exercise. We address this problem by 
regressing the available fixed effects on country characteristics such as GDP, population, and oil 
exports and use the results to predict fixed effects for the cases with missing data. The total 
number of such cases is less than 10 percent of importer and exporters, the most important ones 
being transition countries that export oil, but have limited data for estimation, especially before 
1995. Excluding such countries from the simulation exercises does not change the main results. 
But, we decided to include them to ensure that the exercises are more comprehensive.  
Another aspect of missing data challenge is that production and uses do not balance for 
many countries because of their dealings with the countries left out of the simulation exercise. 
We address this problem by taking the shares of all such transactions as given. So, the 
equilibrium of the exercises is derived with the remaining shares of production and expenditure 
being balanced through price adjustments.  
The fourth challenge is modeling overall supply and demand elasticity for each country. 
We assume that the aggregate expenditure is a constant elasticity function of the aggregate price 
of imports and own oil in each country. We obtain short and long run elasticities of oil demand 
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from Cooper (2003) and Altinay (2007) for 24 developed countries. For the rest, we use 
Krichene’s (2005) estimated price elasticity of demand for the world, which equals -0.06 in the 
short run and -0.26 in the long run. 3 We follow a different procedure for obtaining supply 
elasticity. We could not find supply elasticity estimates for individual countries. However, 
Krichene (2002) offers a long run price elasticity of 0.10 for the supply of crude oil in the world, 
with the short sun elasticity being negative, though small and statistically not different from zero. 
We augment this result by using the estimate of the heterogeneity factors for each supplier, wjit, 
as a relative supply elasticity indicator. We scale these indicators such that the weighted supply 
elasticity of world production of oil equals 0.1 in the long run. The weights that we use are the 
shares of directed dyad exports in total world exports. For the short run, we assume that supply 
elasticity is 0 for all oil producers. We should add that these estimates are quite imprecise and 
seem to be only marginally different from zero. 
The fifth challenge is to translate the simulated partnership probabilities into an actual 
trade/no-trade outcome. For this purpose, once we calculate the probabilities of trade between 
directed dyads from equation (2) given the dyad’s characteristics, we employ the following rule 
for determining the existence of trade, indicated by Tji, which equals 1 in case of trade in the 
directed dyad ji and equals 0 in the absence of trade. We first check whether Tji  is equal to 1 or 0 
originally in actual data. If initially Tji  = 1 and the updated probability of trade is greater than or 
equal to 0.5, then the updated Tji  is set to 1, otherwise Tji  = 0 if the probability of trade drops by 
more than a tolerance level, t. When the initially Tji  = 0, we set the updated Tji  = 0 as long as the 
updated probability derived from the model is less than or equal to 0.5, otherwise we set the 
updated Tji  = 1 if the probability has risen by more than t. The role of t is to deal with 
unobserved factors that create partnerships or prevent a dyad from trading. A higher t means that 
trade partnerships do not form or fall apart with small changes in our measured probability of 
trade. Lower values of t discount the role of factors that may account for persistence in trade 
partnerships or lack thereof, but are not captured in our model. For our experiments, we set t = 
0.1, but our sensitivity analysis suggests that higher values of t do not change the results much. 
                                                 
3 These estimates are obtained with cointegration method. For the same time period, when they use vector error 
correction method they obtain -0.12 for the long run price elasticity and -0.01 for the short run price elasticity of 
demand. 
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However, lower values of t do cause shifts in trade patterns, though still with limited impact on 
aggregate price changes. 
Our final challenge is to deal possible multiplicity or non-existence of equilibria. This is a 
problem in our model because in the absence of exports from country j to country i, the price in j 
may drop and the price in i may rise so much that makes trade between them profitable, while in 
the presence of trade prices become such that the trade probability equation negates such trade. 
Such fluctuations also affect aggregate prices and each country’s choices regarding their other 
partners, potentially giving rise to multiple equilibria and non-existence. Such situations are 
uncommon, but there are few dyads in some simulations that display such problems and prevent 
the convergence of our numerical solution algorithm. We address this concern by assuming that 
if, after for allowing for the tolerance level, a dyad finds it profitable to trade in the absence of 
initial trade, it will choose to trade even if profitability of trade may come into question once 
prices change as a result of trade.   
3.5.2 Oil Prices and Economic Growth 
Our first experiment with the model is to see if it can reproduce the fast growth of 
international oil prices during 1997-2007, when the average price of crude oil increased from 
$19 per barrel in 1997 to $72 in 2007, or given the 30 percent CPI rise during the same period, a 
real increase of 190 percent in ten years. We focus the decade before 2008 to avoid 
complications that the crisis of 2008-2009 may have introduced, when the price of oil first rose 
sharply and then dropped precipitously. We calculate the oil expenditure increase of each 
country by using its GDP growth rates given in World Development Indicators of World Bank 
and multiplying it by the income elasticities of oil use estimated by Gately and Huntington 
(2002). The first row of Table 3.8 shows the result of the simulation for four different 
combinations of demand and supply elasticities. It is clear from the table that if we take the long 
run elasticities, the sharp rise in oil prices cannot be explained by the demand and supply 
changes in world markets. However, if the actual elasticities are closer to their short run 
estimates then the model produces average world prices for oil close to the actual outcome. The 
role that demand price elasticity plays in this outcome is particularly important in this. Given the 
imprecise estimation of long run price elasticities, it is possible that indeed the elasticities over 
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the decade are closer to the short run ones and the model can account for a good part of the rise 
in prices during the decade. 4 
The rise in oil prices is often attributed to the increase in the demand from two fast 
growth giant economies, China and India. We explore this issue by recalculating the equilibrium 
under different elasticity estimates, lowering the growth rates of these two countries by half. The 
second row of Table 3.8 shows these results, which indicate that about one fifth of the growth 
induced rise in oil prices could be attributed to the fast growth of these two economies. By way 
of comparison, we carry out two similar simulations, separately cutting the growth rates of 
OECD and transition countries in half. The first experiment, reported in the third row of Table 
3.8, shows that the fast growth in transition countries accounts for a part of world oil price 
increase that is very similar to the one caused by China and India. The second experiment 
reported in the last row of Table 3.8 points to the fact that fast growth in OECD countries may 
have been a more significant contributory factor, accounting for about one fourth of the growth-
induced oil price rise between 1997 and 2007. 
3.5.3 The Impact of International Conflict: Confrontation between Iran and the West 
We now use our model to examine the consequences of one of the most important 
conflicts of recent years, the confrontation between Iran and Western countries, which is closely 
related to the decision of Iranian government to pursue uranium enrichment. International 
community has a serious concern over Iran's disputed nuclear program because it can be used to 
make nuclear weapons. United States and Western countries have been constantly pressuring the 
United Nations to put sanctions on Iran. We examine the consequences of possible actions that 
might be taken against Iran and possible retaliation by Iran, such as reducing its oil supply or 
creating a war-like situation around the Persian Gulf, which could result in higher transportation 
costs for the oil-exporting countries of the region. Since Iran’s role in oil market is non-
negligible, one might expect non-trivial changes in world oil price and oil trade partnerships 
following these actions.  
Our first experiment is to increase the Ongoing Hostility between Iran and a group of 
countries.5 We then recalculate the probabilities of trade and find out whether higher hostilities 
                                                 
4 Krichene (2002) estimates the long run price elasticity of crude oil as -0.0005 for 1973-1999. 
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change the oil trade partnership structure in the world. We also compare the initial and posterior 
share of purchases of this group of countries with Iran. Our results are presented in Table 3.9. 
According to our results, twelve countries stop trading with Iran due to high hostility, and eight 
countries keep trading. Moreover, the share of Iranian oil in the purchases of those who did not 
stop trading with Iran drop only trivially. This result again confirms that hostility is not 
significant in explaining the amount of trade once there is an existing trade partnership. 
We are also interested in learning the impact of higher hostility levels with Iran on the 
other oil exporters. Does it create more opportunities for them to sell their oil? How much more 
would they expect to sell? In order to understand the consequences further, we list the top oil 
supplier of each country in the hostile group and then compare their initial and posterior share. 
We also identify the oil exporting country that faces the biggest change in the share of the hostile 
countries’ oil exports. We present our results in Table 3.10. The trading partners of twelve 
countries which stop trading with Iran observe a much higher demand for their oil. The average 
increase of the purchases of hostile countries from their top supplier is about 7 percent.  Not 
surprisingly, the countries that keep trading with Iran, despite the hostility, increase their 
purchases from their top oil suppliers very modestly. The oil exporting country that has the 
biggest change in share is Iran when a hostile country stops trading. Higher hostility with Iran hit 
the Bulgaria the most since Iran is its top supplier of oil; 41 percent of its oil purchases comes 
from Iran. Finally, Iran observes a slight increase in the share of hostile countries who continue 
to trade (see Table 3.11).  
Next we work on a situation resulted from a more radical decision taken by the group of 
countries we listed above. Suppose that they decide to put an embargo on Iranian oil. So, the 
probability of trade between a dyad will not be determined endogenously in the model unlike the 
hostility experiment, but is set equal to zero for Iran and the group of countries that decide to put 
an embargo to Iranian oil. In this scenario the outcome is more severe and the world weighted 
average of buyer price goes up by 1.76 percent and the world weighted average of seller price 
goes down by 0.91 percent. It has also considerable effect on Iran as its supplier price drops 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Canada, USA, Israel, Japan, Cyprus, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,  Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, UK, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,  Sweden, Switzerland, Gibraltar, Malta, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, TFYR Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Australia, New Zealand. 
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sharply by 23 percent. Because of the embargo if the production of Iran drops by 20 percent then 
the increase on average buyer price would be 4.61 percent and each additional 20 percent drop in 
supply would further increase the world weighted average of buyer price by 1.6 - 2.4 percent. On 
the other hand, the impact on the world weighted average of seller price would be higher; each 
extra 20 percent cut in Iranian supply would increase the seller price by 1.9 - 2.4 percent (see 
Table 3.12).  
The impact of embargo on Iranian oil on the trade relationship with other oil exporters is 
summarized in Table 3.13. Since embargo dictates all countries in the hostile group to stop 
trading with Iran the impact is bigger compared to previous experiment. All countries previously 
trading with Iran, except Canada, start buying from their top suppliers about 2 to 10 percent 
more.  
Suppose that Iran retaliate by sinking the oil tankers and blocking the Strait of Hormuz to 
disrupt oil delivery. This would turn into higher transportation costs for the oil exporting 
countries located in Persian Gulf region, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Qatar, the major oil producers of Middle East. If the current routes become insecure 
those countries would have to divert oil to Red Sea to safely transfer the oil. In order to simulate 
this situation we hypothetically increase the actual distance from these oil exporting countries to 
all possible destination countries by 50 percent. The trade partnership structure and import prices 
change dramatically. The increase in world weighted average of buyer price would be 8.91 
percent after the retaliation of Iran. The hostile group of countries would experience 4 to 10 
percent increase in their import prices, and Asian countries about 7 to 9 percent.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have estimated a model of bilateral oil trade, controlling for the role of 
selection in partnership formation and source heterogeneity in the flow of oil among countries. 
The model displays a good fit and offers important insights into the working of the global oil 
market. The results show that ignoring these controls introduces significant biases in the 
estimation of the elasticities of oil trade with respect to its determinants.  
We use the model to carry out a series of global equilibrium simulation exercises to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the model. In particular, we show that for the rise in oil prices 
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during 1997-2007 to have been caused by economic growth around the world, the demand and 
supply price elasticities must have been closer to their short run estimates found in the literature. 
Moreover, relatively high growth in OECD countries followed by rapid growth in transition 
countries and India and China account for the bulk of the rise in global oil prices. We also show 
that the model can be used to explore various scenarios of oil price responses to international 
security issues, especially the conflicts of Iran with the West. 
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3.7. Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 3.1 List of the World’s Giant Oilfields 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
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Table 3.2 Oil Well Productivity and Number of Oil Wells in Oil Producing Countries 
Country 
 
Oil Well 
Productivity 
(barrel/well/day)
Number of Oil 
Wells 
 
Oil Exports 
(US $) 
 
Oil Production 
(barrel/day) 
Australia 447 1417 1366979 633000 
Austria 19 950 10124.5 18400 
Azerbaijan 143 2102 4822 300000 
Canada 41 54061 7419122 2216501 
China 47 72255 2865583 3400000 
Crotia 29 723 34374 21000 
Denmark 1714 213 839095.7 365000 
France 57 463 8452 26200 
Georgia 7 281 15434 2000 
Germany 72 991 195996.3 71700 
Greece 320 10 70477 3200 
Hungary 23 944 4456 21700 
India 201 3300 8492 663000 
Indonesia 134 8373 5639051 1120000 
Iran 3080 1120 1.52E+07 3450000 
Iraq 1205 1685 1563402 2030000 
Israel 14 7 3809.667 100 
Italy 418 208 90288.66 87000 
Japan 76 157 11835 12000 
Kazakhstan 69 11676 1445372 800000 
Kuwait 2025 790 8184348 1600000 
Malaysia 964 788 2702659 760000 
Netherlands 207 203 3550546 42000 
New Zealand 466 73 190953 34000 
Norway 3782 833 1.99E+07 3150000 
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Table 3.2 (cont.) 
Country 
 
Oil Well 
Productivity 
(barrel/well/day)
Number of Oil 
Wells 
 
Oil Exports 
(US $) 
 
Oil Production 
(barrel/day) 
Pakistan 240 250 46654 60000 
Papua New Guinea 1179 39 670643 46000 
Phillippines 1750 8 11205 14000 
Poland 12 1404 926 16500 
Romania 20 6000 7 118000 
Russia 179 41192 1.72E+07 7385000 
Saudi Arabia  4730 1560 4.19E+07 7378800 
Spain 310 21 4772 6500 
Taiwan 11 73 95724 800 
Thailand 174 749 151376.3 130000 
Turkey 56 846 70897 47000 
Turkmenistan 73 2460 14575 180000 
UK 1622 1387 1.03E+07 2250000 
Ukraine 58 1353 51244.33 78000 
U.S.  11 521070 479276.7 5731770 
Uzbekistan 68 2190 6746.333 150000 
Venezuela  157 15395 1.14E+07 2417015 
 
  Source: Oil & Gas Journal, 2010. 
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Table 3.3 Estimates of Oil Exports with Oil Production and Oil Well Productivity by OLS † 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Oil Exports 
Oil Production   2.198**  
(0.316) 
3.26**
(0.399)  
Oil Well Productivity 3800**
(560.736)  
5739** 
(718.946) 
Observations 
 42 42 42 
R2 
 0.82 0.63 0.61 
 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
+ 10% significance level 
* 5% significance level 
** 1% significance level 
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Table 3.4 Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
Name Description Source 
Trade jit Logarithm of crude oil exports from country j  to country i at 
time t (SITC4 level, code 3330) in thousands of constant 2000 
US dollars. 
Robert Feenstra, "“World 
Trade Flows (WTO), 1962–
2000." 
www.internationaldata.org  
Oil 
Production jt 
Logarithm of crude oil production in exporting country j  at time 
t in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) & 
International Energy 
Agency (IEA) 
Oil 
Expenditure it 
Logarithm of crude oil expenditure in importing country i  at time 
t  in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. 
EIA, IEA and WTO 
Distanceji Logarithm of the great circle distance (in km) between exporter's 
j and importer's i capitals 
Centre D'Etudes 
Prospectives et 
D'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII)  
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisg
raph/cepii/cepii.htm 
Colonialji A binary variable that is unity if exporting country j ever 
colonized importing country i or vice versa. 
Land Borderji A binary variable that is unity if exporter j and importer i share a 
common land border 
Contiguityji Dichotomous indicator  that shows direct contiguity of exporter j 
and importer i  (1 = Land Border, 2 = 1-12 miles water, 3 = 13-
24, 4= 25-150 , 5 = 151-400, 6= not)  
Correlates of War Database 
http://www.correlatesofwar.
org/ 
Islandji A binary variable that is unity if both exporter j and importer i are 
islands 
CIA The World Factbook  
Landlockedji A binary variable that is unity if both exporting country j and 
importing country i have no direct access to sea 
CIA The World Factbook 
 
Legalji A binary variable that is unity if the exporting country j and 
importing country i share the same legal origin. 
Easterly & Yu 
Languageji A binary variable that is unity if the exporting country j and 
importing country i uses a common language 
CIA The World Factbook 
Religionji (% Protestants in country j  % Protestants in country i)  
+ (% Catholics in country j  %Catholics in country i)  
+ (% Muslims in country j  %Muslims in country i) 
Encyclopedia Britannica 
Book of the Year 2001 
Ongoing 
Hostilityjit 
Dichotomous indicator of ongoing hostility between exporting 
country j and the importing country i . 
Correlates of War Database 
http://www.correlatesofwar.
org/ 
Risk of 
Contract 
Repudiationjt 
A binary variable that takes the value one if contract repudiation 
in country j is less than the median score of all countries, zero 
otherwise. This variable is constructed separately for both 
exporting country j and the importing country i . If the score of a 
country is less than the median it has a higher risk for repudiation 
of contracts. 
Political Risk Services, Inc., 
ICGR Dataset 
GDPjt Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product in thousands of constant 
2000 US dollars. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
www.worldbank.org/data  
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Table 3.5 Estimates of the Oil Trade Equations Using Contract Repudiation as Excluded Variable†  
Pooled Panel of Directed Dyads with Instrumental Variables for Production and Expenditure, 1982-1997 
 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
‡ Marginal effects on probability of partnership at sample mean. 
 + 10% significance level  
* 5% significance level  
** 1% significance level 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tij Log of Exports of j to i, xji 
Model: Probit‡  Benchmark IVREG Polynomial IVREG
Log of Oil Production by Exporter, 
Lagged 
0.139** 0.645** 0.823** 
(0.0230) (0.129) (0.226) 
Log of Oil Expenditure by Importer, 
Lagged 
0.0529** 0.522** 0.766** 
(0.0111) (0.146) (0.171) 
Log of Distance -1.078** -1.020** -1.168** 
(0.0445) (0.101) (0.327) 
Contiguity 0.108** 0.0981* 0.121* 
(0.0238) (0.0484) (0.0521) 
Island -0.251 -0.533 -0.572 
(0.208) (0.531) (0.535) 
Landlocked 0.457 0.775 1.266* 
(0.315) (0.601) (0.602) 
Legal 0.229** 0.305** 0.321* 
(0.0518) (0.106) (0.126) 
Language -0.0312 -0.150 -0.0926 
(0.0753) (0.138) (0.136) 
Colonial Ties 0.340** 0.432+ 0.428+ 
(0.127) (0.230) (0.249) 
Religion 0.267* 0.318 0.611* 
(0.123) (0.249) (0.273) 
Ongoing Hostility, Lagged -0.958** 0.782 -0.301 
(0.210) (2.809) (0.329) 
Exporter Risk of Contract Repudiation 0.0101 
(0.0272) 
-0.0145 
(0.0483) 
0.0266 
(0.0506) 
Importer Risk of Contract Repudiation -0.0943* 
(0.0385) 
-0.0431 
(0.0820)  
*ˆ
ij    1.210
** 
  (0.374) 
*ˆ
ijz  
  2.803** 
  (0.855) 
2*
iˆjz  
  -0.604* 
  (0.244) 
Observations 105932 7529 7529 
R2 . 0.551 0.560 
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Table 3.6 Estimates of Oil Trade with Ongoing Hostility as Excluded Variable† 
Pooled Panel of Directed Dyads with Instrumental Variables for Production and Expenditure, 1980-2000 
 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
‡ Marginal effects on probability of partnership at sample mean. 
+ 10% significance level 
* 5% significance level 
** 1% significance level 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tij Log of Exports of j to i, xji 
Model: Probit‡  Benchmark IVREG Polynomial IVREG
Log of Oil Production by Exporter, 
Lagged 
0.159** 0.697** 0.902** 
(0.0234) (0.117) (0.244) 
Log of Oil Expenditure by Importer, 
Lagged 
0.0838** 0.560** 0.834** 
(0.00936) (0.106) (0.191) 
Log of Distance -0.970** -1.066** -1.244** 
(0.0377) (0.0916) (0.374) 
Contiguity 0.0949** 0.117* 0.146** 
(0.0210) (0.0464) (0.0553) 
Island -0.231 -0.983+ -0.957+ 
(0.176) (0.513) (0.527) 
Landlocked 0.502 0.210 0.802 
(0.307) (0.750) (0.769) 
Legal 0.220** 0.250** 0.278* 
(0.0441) (0.0969) (0.129) 
Language -0.0648 -0.194 -0.153 
(0.0632) (0.125) (0.124) 
Colonial Ties 0.397** 0.475* 0.481+ 
(0.111) (0.211) (0.260) 
Religion 0.199+ 0.453* 0.768** 
(0.105) (0.225) (0.245) 
Ongoing Hostility, Lagged -0.683** 0.0655  
(0.156) (0.893)  
*ˆ
ij    1.239
** 
  (0.431) 
*ˆ
ijz  
  2.852** 
  (0.958) 
2*
iˆjz  
  -0.621* 
  (0.286) 
Observations 175206 10589 10589 
R2 . 0.546 0.552 
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Table 3.7 Estimates of Oil Trade with Ongoing Hostility as Excluded Variable, 1980-2000† 
 Decomposition of Bias Effects  
 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
‡ Marginal effects on probability of partnership at sample mean. 
+ 10% significance level 
* 5% significance level 
** 1% significance level 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports of j to i, xji 
Model: Benchmark IVREG 
Polynomial 
IVREG 
Heterogeneity 
Correction  
IVREG 
Selection 
Correction 
IVREG 
Log of Oil Production by 
Exporter, Lagged 
0.697** 0.902** 0.453** 1.305** 
(0.117) (0.244) (0.123) (0.187) 
Log of Oil Expenditure by 
Importer, Lagged 
0.560** 0.834** 0.431** 1.125** 
(0.106) (0.191) (0.102) (0.155) 
Log of Distance -1.066** -1.244** -0.401** -2.053** 
(0.0916) (0.374) (0.135) (0.211) 
Contiguity 0.117* 0.146** 0.0680 0.235** 
(0.0464) (0.0553) (0.0465) (0.0488) 
Island -0.983+ -0.957+ -0.840 -1.162* 
(0.513) (0.527) (0.514) (0.531) 
Landlocked 0.210 0.802 0.150 1.273+ 
(0.750) (0.769) (0.771) (0.699) 
Legal 0.250** 0.278* 0.0856 0.481** 
(0.0969) (0.129) (0.101) (0.104) 
Language -0.194 -0.153 -0.0966 -0.205+ 
(0.125) (0.124) (0.122) (0.124) 
Colonial Ties 0.475* 0.481+ 0.148 0.835** 
(0.211) (0.260) (0.216) (0.217) 
Religion 0.453* 0.768** 0.587** 0.939** 
(0.225) (0.245) (0.221) (0.240) 
Ongoing Hostility, Lagged 0.0655    
(0.893)    
*ˆ
ij   1.239
**  1.671** 
 (0.431)  (0.298) 
*ˆ
ijz  
 2.852** 1.748**  
 (0.958) (0.315)  
2*
iˆjz  
 -0.621*   
 (0.286)   
Observations 10589 10589 10589 10589 
R2 0.546 0.552 0.555 0.538 
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Table 3.8 Percent Change in World Weighted Average of Seller Price of Oil  
Induced by GDP Growth During 1997-2007† 
 Long Run 
Demand and 
Supply 
Elasticities 
Long Run 
Demand 
Elasticities, 
Short Run 
Supply 
Elasticities 
Short Run 
Demand 
Elasticities, 
Long Run 
Supply 
Elasticities 
Short Run 
Demand and 
Supply 
Elasticities 
Scenario 1: Actual GDP 
Growth 53.3 71.1 123.8 260.3 
Scenario 2: Halved Growth in 
India and China 44.4 58.9 97.8 205.7 
Scenario 3: Halved Growth in 
Transition Countries 45.2 60.3 99.1 206.5 
Scenario 4: Halved Growth in 
OECD Countries 43.5 57.1 95.2 195.5 
 
† Oil production in each country is used as a weight for the role of its supply price in the aggregate world price 
index. 
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Table 3.9 The Impact of Increased Hostility with Iran on the Trade Relationship with Iran 
Countries with 
Increased 
Hostility 
Initial 
Probability 
Posterior 
Probability 
Countries 
Stop Trading 
Initial Share of 
Purchases 
Posterior 
Share Of 
Purchases 
Canada 0.675 0.407 X 1.90 0.00 
USA 0.964 0.864  0.00 0.00 
Israel 0.478 0.228  0.00 0.00 
Japan 0.877 0.681  13.06 12.14 
Cyprus 0.242 0.240  0.00 0.00 
Belgium 0.772 0.521  7.97 7.44 
Denmark 0.401 0.173  0.00 0.00 
France 0.897 0.717  7.43 6.95 
Germany 0.903 0.729  7.07 6.62 
Greece 0.730 0.476 X 20.04 0.00 
Ireland  0.128 0.034  0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.919 0.761  8.41 7.91 
Netherlands 0.865 0.660  8.01 7.48 
Portugal 0.647 0.380 X 7.70 0.00 
Spain 0.870 0.668  7.60 7.11 
UK 0.795 0.552  1.67 1.55 
Austria 0.705 0.444 X 12.59 0.00 
Finland 0.494 0.240  0.00 0.00 
Norway 0.394 0.168  0.00 0.00 
Sweden 0.699 0.434 X 3.45 0.00 
Switzerland 0.446 0.206 X 7.87 0.00 
Malta 0.040 0.007  0.00 0.00 
Albania 0.005 0.001  0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.274 0.106 X 41.79 0.00 
Belarus 0.996 0.973  0.00 0.00 
Czech Rep. 0.279 0.104 X 18.39 0.00 
Estonia 0.985 0.930  0.00 0.00 
Hungary 0.458 0.213  0.00 0.00 
Poland 0.567 0.306 X 17.52 0.00 
Romania 0.470 0.231 X 14.35 0.00 
Russian Fed 0.205 0.065  0.00 0.00 
Slovakia 0.994 0.966  0.00 0.00 
Ukraine 0.998 0.984  0.00 0.00 
Croatia 0.993 0.960  0.00 0.00 
Slovenia  0.989 0.944  0.00 0.00 
Yugoslavia 0.481 0.239 X 12.05 0.00 
Australia 0.604 0.334  0.00 0.00 
New Zealand 0.398 0.172 X 3.75 0.00 
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Table 3.10 The Impact of Increased Hostility with Iran on the Trade Relationship with Oil Exporters 
Countries with 
Increased 
Hostility 
Country they 
import from the 
most 
Initial 
percentage of 
purchases 
Posterior 
percentage of 
purchases 
Country that has 
biggest change in 
share 
The amount 
of change in 
percentage 
Canada Saudi Arabia 9.66 9.92 Iran -1.90 
USA Saudi Arabia 9.59 9.55 Venezuela 0.05 
Israel Egypt 64.68 64.87 Russian Fed. -0.46 
Japan Saudi Arabia 35.31 35.68 Iran -0.92 
Cyprus Russian Fed 72.35 71.69 Russian Fed. -0.66 
Belgium UK 46.90 47.34 Iran -0.54 
Denmark Norway 47.81 47.78 Russian Fed. -0.08 
France UK 23.00 23.25 Iran -0.49 
Germany Norway 33.19 33.35 Iran -0.45 
Greece Saudi Arabia 38.35 48.85 Iran -20.04 
Ireland  UK 66.59 66.96 UK 0.36 
Italy Libya 35.87 35.68 Iran -0.50 
Netherlands UK 31.85 32.16 Iran -0.54 
Portugal Algeria 25.17 27.09 Iran -7.70 
Spain Algeria 23.09 23.06 Iran -0.49 
UK Norway 7.76 7.62 Iran -0.12 
Austria Saudi Arabia 32.09 37.92 Iran -12.59 
Finland Norway 47.06 47.81 Russian Fed. -0.94 
Norway UK 1.85 1.86 Russian Fed. -0.04 
Sweden Norway 75.87 78.68 Iran -3.45 
Switzerland UK 23.11 25.19 Iran -7.87 
Malta Algeria 58.22 57.79 Nigeria -0.43 
Bulgaria Iran 41.79 0.00 Iran -41.79 
Belarus Russian Fed 69.47 69.40 Russian Fed. -0.07 
Czech Rep. Russian Fed 38.60 46.83 Iran -18.39 
Estonia Russian Fed 53.83 53.72 Russian Fed. -0.11 
Hungary Russian Fed 35.74 35.29 Russian Fed. -0.45 
Poland Norway 33.01 40.76 Iran -17.52 
Romania Russian Fed 18.81 27.73 Iran -14.35 
Russian Fed China 0.81 0.85 China 0.04 
Slovakia Russian Fed 96.56 96.69 Czech Rep. -0.14 
Ukraine Russian Fed 52.52 52.40 Russian Fed. -0.12 
Croatia Norway 9.67 9.74 Russian Fed. -0.23 
Slovenia  Libya 31.71 31.67 Russian Fed. -0.55 
Yugoslavia Russian Fed 14.55 20.52 Iran -12.05 
Australia Saudi Arabia 17.44 17.44 New Zealand -0.03 
New Zealand Australia 25.91 27.23 Iran -3.75 
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Table 3.11 The Impact of Increased Hostility with Iran on the Share of Iran’s Trade Partners 
Iran’s Trade Partners  Percentage share in Iran’s exports 
before hostility increase 
Percentage share in Iran’s 
exports after hostility increase 
Japan† 12.84 13.29 
Korea Rep. 5.64 5.85 
Germany† 4.44 4.63 
Italy† 3.45 3.61 
France† 3.16 3.29 
India 2.34 2.43 
Taiwan 1.97 2.04 
Spain† 1.86 1.94 
China 1.85 1.91 
Netherlands† 1.67 1.74 
Turkey 1.62 1.70 
Belgium† 1.16 1.21 
Greece† 1.13 0.00 
UK† 1.08 1.11 
Poland† 1.06 0.00 
Romania† 1.01 0.00 
Canada† 0.77 0.00 
Bulgaria† 0.69 0.00 
Austria† 0.53 0.00 
Czech Rep† 0.51 0.00 
Portugal† 0.41 0.00 
Sweden† 0.37 0.00 
Switzerland† 0.19 0.00 
Yugoslavia† 0.11 0.00 
New Zealand† 0.08 0.00 
USA† 0.00 0.00 
Israel† 0.00 0.00 
Denmark† 0.00 0.00 
Ireland† 0.00 0.00 
Finland† 0.00 0.00 
Iceland† 0.00 0.00 
Norway† 0.00 0.00 
Russian Fed† 0.00 0.00 
Australia† 0.00 0.00 
† Countries with increased hostility level  
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Table 3.12 Change in World Weighted Average of Buyer and Seller Price of Oil  
Due to Heightened Conflict between Iran and the West 
 Percentage Change in Average weighted buyer price 
Percentage Change in 
Average weighted seller 
price  
Due to Increased Hostility with Iran  0.48  -0.005  
Due to Embargo on Iranian Oil  1.76  -0.91  
Iran’s production drops by 20%  4.61  3.34  
Iran’s production drops by 40%  6.22  5.21  
Iran’s production drops by 60%  8.65  7.62  
Iran attacks Persian Gulf  8.91  7.50  
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Table 3.13 The Impact of Embargo on Iranian Oil on the Trade Relationship with Oil Exporters 
Countries  Put an 
Embargo on 
Iranian Oil 
Country they 
import from the 
most 
Initial 
percentage of 
purchases 
Posterior 
percentage of 
purchases 
Country that has 
biggest change in 
share 
The amount 
of change in 
percentage 
Canada Saudi Arabia 9.66 9.19 Iran -1.90 
USA Saudi Arabia 9.59 9.06 Saudi Arabia -0.53 
Israel Egypt 64.68 64.56 Mexico 0.22 
Japan Saudi Arabia 35.31 41.23 Iran -13.06 
Cyprus Russian Fed 72.35 72.44 Algeria -0.13 
Belgium UK 46.90 50.91 Iran -7.97 
Denmark Norway 47.81 47.96 Norway 0.15 
France UK 23.00 24.81 Iran -7.43 
Germany Norway 33.19 35.88 Iran -7.07 
Greece Saudi Arabia 38.35 48.62 Iran -20.04 
Ireland  UK 66.59 66.65 Norway 0.17 
Italy Libya 35.87 38.53 Iran -8.41 
Netherlands UK 31.85 34.30 Iran -8.01 
Portugal Algeria 25.17 26.65 Iran -7.70 
Spain Algeria 23.09 24.53 Iran -7.60 
UK Norway 7.76 7.82 Iran -1.67 
Austria Saudi Arabia 32.09 37.55 Iran -12.59 
Finland Norway 47.06 47.39 Russian Fed -0.41 
Norway UK 1.85 1.84 Russian Fed -0.02 
Sweden Norway 75.87 78.67 Iran -3.45 
Switzerland UK 23.11 25.05 Iran -7.87 
Malta Algeria 58.22 57.01 Nigeria 1.21 
Bulgaria Iran 41.79 0.00 Iran -41.79 
Belarus Russian Fed 69.47 69.68 Russian Fed 0.21 
Czech Rep. Russian Fed 38.60 47.47 Iran -18.39 
Estonia Russian Fed 53.83 54.14 Russian Fed 0.31 
Hungary Russian Fed 35.74 35.68 Libya -0.24 
Poland Norway 33.01 40.61 Iran -17.52 
Romania Russian Fed 18.81 27.92 Iran -14.35 
Russian Fed China 0.81 0.74 China -0.07 
Slovakia Russian Fed 96.56 96.68 Czech Rep. -0.14 
Ukraine Russian Fed 52.52 52.82 Russian Fed 0.32 
Croatia Norway 9.67 9.69 Russian Fed -0.16 
Slovenia  Libya 31.71 32.24 Libya 0.53 
Yugoslavia Russian Fed 14.55 20.76 Iran -12.05 
Australia Saudi Arabia 17.44 17.49 Kuwait 0.15 
New Zealand Australia 25.91 27.08 Iran -3.75 
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Figure 3.1 Map of All Drilled Wells in Utah 
 
 
The top 250 wells make up less than 2% of the more than 13,500 wells in Utah, yet have produce  
more than 45% of Utah Oil and Gas 
Source: Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining Database (10/2003) 
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Figure 3.2 Utah Oil and Gas Production to Date 
 
 
 
Statewide cumulative production of oil and gas is 2.60 billion barrels of oil equivalent  
(BBOE): enough to supply the United States’ fossil-fuel energy needs for 2.8 months 
Sources: Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining Database (10/2003) and 
Energy Information Administration 
 
` 
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CHAPTER 4 
NON-OIL ENERGY TRADE: 
THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY AND HETEROGENEITY OF SOURCES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The need for finding energy sources alternative to oil has been growing due to oil price 
hikes and dramatic growth in developing countries in recent years. Tight oil markets and 
instability in oil exporting countries have added to the urgency of expanding the substitutes for 
oil. One of the most common substitutes for oil is natural gas, which has been used in some 
countries for many years. In addition to natural gas, coal is viewed as a close substitute, 
sometimes serving as a direct replacement for oil through the coal-to-liquids method. Bio-fuels 
are also being strongly encouraged and gaining popularity in many countries. 
Based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, world price of oil has increased by 
278 percent during 1997-2007, much faster than the rise in consumer price of 30 percent during 
the same period. The corresponding increase in the price of natural gas was 126 percent, and for 
coal was 62 percent. During this period, according to the Statistical Review of World Energy 
2009 published by British Petroleum, global oil production had increased by 13 percent, while 
production of natural gas had grown by 32.5 percent and coal by 37.2 percent.  China doubled its 
demand and production of coal in the last decade, with a share of 42 percent in world total. 
Hence, with the growing energy consumption and heightened energy prices, demand has shifted 
away from oil, the energy source with the greatest price increase, and towards gas and especially 
coal, the source with the smallest price increase so far.  
In this paper, we try to understand the trade patterns of oil’s substitutes around the world 
and how it links with the crude oil trade. We construct price and quantity indices for three forms 
of energy—natural gas, coal and electricity (GCE)—that are substitutes for each other and oil. 
We use the approach developed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), HMR hereafter, to 
specify and estimate a model of bilateral trade in GCE forms of energy. We employ the 
estimation results to analyze the role of various factors in the formation of partnerships and 
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bilateral flows in GCE trade. We also examine how these factors affect the cost of GCE for each 
country and ultimately shape world prices and trade patterns.  
The HMR approach addresses a number of important concerns in estimating the equation 
for bilateral trade flows often encountered in the standard gravity framework. One such concern 
is the large number of zeros among country dyads. Including these observations in the 
regressions biases the coefficient estimates downward due to truncation. On the other hand, 
focusing on the sample of bilateral relationships with positive trade poses a selection problem. In 
addition, the elasticities of energy supply with respect to various factors depend on how 
production within each country responds to changes in those factors. Exporting countries with 
very heterogeneous sources may face rapidly rising costs if they try to expand production and 
exports, while those with more homogenous sources may be able to respond with larger changes 
in trade volumes. Ignoring the role of these effects in the formation of trade partnerships and 
volume of trade is another source of bias in standard gravity estimations. The HMR framework 
allows us to deal with both selection and heterogeneity issues and explain both partnerships as 
well as trade flows. 
HMR develop a theoretical model of international trade with heterogeneous firms from 
which they derive two equations: one determining the formation of partnerships and the other 
trade volumes for the formed partnerships. Their empirical results for trade flow across all 
products show that ignoring the unobserved firm heterogeneity and selection effects causes 
upward bias in trade elasticity estimates based on the standard gravity model. Our estimates for 
the model of GCE trade using dyadic panel data for 1982-1997 confirm the existence of such 
biases in energy trade elasticities. 
A critical aspect of HMR structural model is that its estimation requires a variable that 
affects the probability of trade but is uncorrelated with the residual of the trade volume equation. 
Factors that affect fixed costs of trade but have no impact on variable trade costs satisfy this 
exclusion restriction. For our estimation, we need a valid excluded variable that works in a panel 
setting. In an earlier study of trade flow for all products (Ergul and Esfahani, 2010), we find that  
Contract Repudiation Index of a country serve such a purpose, affecting fixed costs, but not 
variable costs, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. In this study, we show that this 
variable plays a similar role in energy trade.  
74 
 
We use the econometric estimation results to simulate a model of global GCE trade. We 
also compare the projections of the model for 1997-2007 with the actual outcomes to assess the 
performance of the model and the required assumption for reproducing actual trends. The results 
confirm that our model is able to predict actual values quite well under reasonable assumptions. 
We finally highlight the potential applications of the model by examining the outcome of a 
conflict scenario between Russia and Europe over gas supply. 
In section 4.2 we present a modified version of the HMR model, which we employ in our 
estimation. We describe the data and discuss the regression results in sections 4.3 and 4.4, 
respectively. In section 4.5, we present our simulation experiments. Section 4.6 concludes the 
paper.  
4.2 Description of the Model  
In order to estimate the elasticities of GCE trade, we use HMR model. For our purposes, 
it is sufficient to describe the main equations determining trade probabilities and trade flows, 
adapted to a panel setting. HMR show that the probability of formation of a partnership between 
exporter j and importer i is related to  
(1) zjit = 0  cjt + (1)(jit + aL  pit) + yit  fjit + ujit ,  
where 0 is a constant and ujit ~ N(0, u2) is a random factor affecting the profits of exporting 
from j to i at time t. The other variables are defined as follows: 
: the elasticity of substitution among GCE varieties (GCE from different sources),  
cjt: log of average unit cost of production of GCE in country j at time t,  
jit: log of unit trade costs of exporting GCE from j to i at time t,  
aL: productivity of the most efficient production station, 
pit: log of the average price of GCE in country i at time t, 
yit: log of total expenditure on GCE in country i at time t, 
fjit: log of the fixed costs of exporting GCE from j to i at time t. 
The fixed costs have a number of components. Specifically, fjit xxjt + mmit + jit  
vjit, where vjit is a random factor distributed as N(0, v2), 's are parameters, mit is a fixed trade 
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barrier imposed by importing country on all exporters at time t, xjt is a measure of fixed export 
costs common across all export destinations at time t, and jit is a measure of any additional 
country-pair specific fixed trade costs. These fixed cost components may be further decomposed 
into time-variant and time-invariant components.  
 Given the above specification, the composite random element in (1) will be jit = vjit + ujit, 
where jit ~ N(0, 2) and 2 = u2 + v2. Using Tjit as a dichotomous indicator of trade, the 
probability that country j exports to country i at time t (Tjit = 1) can be expressed as: 
(2)  Pr(Tjit=1| observables) = [

1 (0  cjt  (1)(jit + aL  pit) + yit  xxjt  mmit  jit)], 
where  is cdf of unit-normal distribution.  
The volume of exports from country j to country i when there is a partnership forms a 
gravity-type equation, which can be expressed in log-linear form as: 
(3) x jit = 0  (1)cjt + njt  (1)( jit  pit ) + yit + wjit + ujit,  
where 0 is a constant, njt is the log of number of production stations in the exporting country, 
and wjit is the heterogeneity factor of production stations that export from j to i. The key 
difference between this equation and the standard gravity model is the heterogeneity effect of 
production stations, wjit. This term need not be symmetric with respect to the direction of trade. 
Its value is determined by the marginal profitability of exporting from j to i. Since the 
determinants of volume of trade are also related to marginal profitability, their coefficients are 
likely to be biased if wjit is left out. Another source of bias is the selection problem due to higher 
values of ujit among dyads that become trade partners, which causes a correlation between this 
term and the factors affecting profitability of trade included on the right-hand side of the 
equation (Heckman 1979).  
 HMR show that wjit can be derived as a monotonic function of zjit: When zjit > 0, wjit = 
ln[exp(zjit) 1], where  is a positive parameter. This relationship provides a means of 
estimating wjit based on the estimate of zjit from equation (2), . Equation (2) also offers a way 
of dealing with the selection bias caused by the fact that ujit is truncated. Given the estimate of 
*ˆ
jitz
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jit from (2), we have E[ujit | ., Tjit = 1] = βuη , where βuη ≡ corr (ujit, ujit)(σu/ση) and = 
E[jit/ση| ., Tjit = 1]. With these considerations in mind, the trade volume equation becomes: 
(4) x jit = 0  ( 1)cjt + njt  ( 1)( jit  pit ) + yit + ln[exp( )  1]  +βuη +  ejit, 
where ejit is i.i.d. Note that the term containing  is nonlinear, which complicates the 
estimation procedure a bit. To facilitate estimation, HMR use a Taylor expansion of the 
nonlinear term and find that the results are largely unaffected. We follow their procedure and 
replace the nonlinear term with a quadratic polynomial of . 
The crucial issue in the estimation of the system of equations (2) and (4) is that except the 
fixed-cost factors, all the variables determining *ˆ jitz  and 
*ˆ
jit  are included on the right-hand side 
of (4). As a result, finding variables that represent only the fixed costs and, thus, can be excluded 
from (4) is crucial in making it possible to identify the heterogeneity and selection effects in the 
trade volume equation. In the next section, we discuss this choice along with the description of 
our data.  
4.3 Data  
The dataset that we use is an unbalanced panel that covers 15,500 directed dyads 
involving 125 countries during 1982-1997. However, due to missing data points, we end up with 
a total of 181,799 observations that have complete information, amounting to an average of 
about 12 years of data per directed dyad. 
The data sources and the variables used in our empirical analysis are described in Table 
4.1. We define our dependent variable as GCE exports from country j to country i. It is 
composed of three sub-categories of energy—gas, coal, and electricity. At the aggregate level, 
the share of natural gas in total trade value is approximately 63 percent, coal 30 percent, and 
electricity less than 7 percent.  
In our regressions we include the log of value of GCE production by adding the sum of 
production in three energy categories (in US dollars) for exporting countries to account for the 
number of production units and their average productivity, serving as a proxy for njt  ( 1)cjt. 
We also include the log of GCE expenditure (in US dollars) for importing countries as a measure 
*ˆ
jit *ˆ jit
*ˆ
jitz
*ˆ
jit
*ˆ
jitz
*ˆ
jitz
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of yit. Since these variables are likely to be endogenous, we use their lagged values as 
instruments. As indicators of trade costs, jit, we use Distance, shared Border, shared Legal 
system, Colonial Ties, shared Religions, shared dominant Language, and Ongoing Hostility. 
Since the contemporaneous value of Ongoing Hostility may be affected by the trade relations, we 
use its lagged value as an explanatory variable. Following HMR, we also include indicators 
showing whether or not both countries are Landlocked or Islands. We employ time fixed effects 
to take account of global shocks and exporter and importer fixed effects to account for the time 
invariant unobserved country characteristics. 
In order to take account of the selection and heterogeneity effects, we use Contract 
Repudiation Index as the excluded variable, which should theoretically be a valid one, as we 
argue and empirically support it in Ergul and Esfahani (2010). This index is constructed by 
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995), using International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset 
of the Political Risk Services, Inc. It is defined as an indicator that "addresses the possibility that 
foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants face the risk of a modification in a contract 
taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down due to an income drop, budget 
cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government economic 
and social priorities." Such risks, and the efforts to overcome them, should have a major effect 
on the fixed costs of setting up production and arranging exports, but not necessarily the variable 
costs. Since Contract Repudiation is country specific, rather being dyad specific, we include the 
indicators for the exporter and importer separately in the equation. These could be viewed as 
representing xjt and mit. To the extent that these variables affect only the fixed cost of trade, 
they should appear with significant negative coefficients in equation (2), but not in equation (4).  
4.4 Estimation Results 
Table 4.2 presents our main estimation results. The first column shows the estimates for 
the probability of trade equation. The second column is the benchmark estimate for the trade 
volume equation, without controls for selection or heterogeneity effects. Note that both exporter 
and importer Contract Repudiation indicators are highly significant in the equation for trade 
partnership probability, while lacking significance in the benchmark model. This supports our 
claim that policy risks largely affect the fixed costs of GCE trade, but not its variable costs. 
Using these indicators as excluded variables along with the measures of selection and 
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heterogeneity derived from the first column, the third column shows the estimates of the 
polynomial version of equation (4). The selection and heterogeneity terms are all significant and 
their inclusion has a non-trivial impact on the elasticity coefficients. 
In the estimation results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2, GCE production in the 
exporting country, total GCE expenditure in the importing country, Distance between the two 
countries, existence of shared Border, Colonial Ties, and Ongoing Hostility emerge with high 
statistical significance levels and reasonable signs and magnitudes in both equations. Indicators 
of shared Legal System and Landlocked status prove significant in the probability of trade 
equation, but not in the level of trade. This could be because, like Contract Repudiation, they 
mainly influence the fixed costs of trade. The positive sign of the Landlocked indicator needs a 
bit of explanation. The increase in the probability of GCE trade partnerships is essentially due to 
added border and neighborhood effects in central Africa and central Europe, where there are 
clusters of landlocked countries that find trade among themselves relatively less costly than trade 
with others. Sharing the Island status seems to have the opposite effect and shows a negative 
effect on the variable costs of trade with a marginal level of significance. The presence of a 
Common Language or Common Religion does not seem to matter for GCE trade. 
As the third column of Table 4.2 shows, the elasticity of trade with respect to production 
proves to be rather large, but still smaller than one, suggesting that while most of increased 
production is exported to existing customers, a small part gets exported to new customers or goes 
toward increased domestic consumption. Expenditure elasticity in the importing country turns 
out to be much lower than one, suggesting that importers try to diversify their sources and 
possibly raise domestic production as their consumptions rise. The absolute value of the 
elasticity of trade with respect to distance is found to be greater than one. This, along with the 
large coefficient of the Border variable, highlights the important role of distance in GCE trade 
and helps explain why most countries tend to provide their demands for these types of energy 
from nearby sources. 
An important issue in assessing the results is the magnitude and direction of bias due to 
selection and heterogeneity effects. Table 4.3 presents the results of introducing the variables 
representing the two effects separately, along with the benchmark and full model estimates. 
Almost all the estimated elasticities go down sharply when only the heterogeneity bias is 
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corrected, and they go up sharply when only the selection bias is corrected. The direction of the 
selection bias is easy to understand: Many unobserved factors that make it more profitable for 
trade partnerships to form help add some observations to the trade volume sample that would not 
otherwise be present based on their observed characteristics. As a result, the effects of the 
observed characteristics appear as weaker than they actually are; i.e., their coefficient estimates 
are downward biased. In the case of GCE trade such biases seem to be quite strong for most of 
the variables included in the regression (compare the first and last columns of Table 4.3). To 
understand the role of heterogeneity in biasing the standard gravity regressions, note that when 
the productivities of GCE production units are very diverse, it is more likely that there are some 
with export potential. Such units will have lower marginal cost of production and, therefore, are 
likely to export large amounts as trade costs decline. Without appropriate controls for 
heterogeneity, the entire response of trade may be attributed to factors included in the regression, 
thus over-estimating their impact on trade. This can account for the sharp drop in elasticities 
when we control for heterogeneity. When corrections are made for both selection and 
heterogeneity, for most right-hand side variables the selection effect turns out to dominate, 
raising the estimated elasticities above the benchmark. In particular, the benchmark estimates for 
the coefficients of GCE production, GCE expenditure, and distance are 0.585, 0.257 and -0.870, 
respectively (see column 1 of Table 4.3).  After correction for the biases, they reach 0.761, 
0.368, and -1.190, respectively (see column 2 of Table 4.3). Similar changes in net effects 
materialize in the case of Ongoing Hostility, shared Language and Landlocked status. Border and 
Island status are the only variables for which the absolute magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
decline somewhat when both corrections are made. However, in these cases, the estimates are 
rather imprecise. Therefore, on the whole, we can conclude that there are overall downward 
biases in the estimated elasticities of the standard regressions, with the selection and 
heterogeneity biases working in opposite directions and the former dominating. 
4.5 Simulations 
4.5.1 The Setup 
In order to assess the performance of our model and to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
results, we carry out a number of simulations by placing the estimated equations in a global 
market equilibrium context. We use our empirical results and HMR’s theoretical model to 
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calculate probabilities of trade partnership, trade volumes, prices, and production and 
consumption levels for all dyads with available data. For our base period, we focus on the 
average of the data over the 1995-1997 period. We allow the average cost of GCE production in 
a country, cjt, to adjust and shifts its export prices up and down to equilibrate total demand for 
the country’s GCE with its production. This is done by adjusting the exporter fixed effects. The 
aggregate effect of price increases for GCE from different sources (derived from a Dixit-Stigliz 
model of differentiated products) can then be turned into an adjustment term in the importer 
fixed effect in the probability of trade equation,  (1)pit /. We assume that the elasticity of 
substitution among GCE varieties is high and set  = 11, which is in range often found in the 
study of substitution elasticities among varieties of the same product. (The results are not very 
sensitive to changes in  within a reasonable range around this value.) As an estimate of , we 
use the inverse of the coefficient of log of expenditure in the Probit regression,  = 1/0.114.  
Building a simulation model based on the regression results poses a number of additional 
challenges and requires important assumptions and modeling choices. The first problem to 
address is the calculation of own use of GCE for countries. The estimation results provide us 
with trade relationships, but not with own use of energy. We assume that own use is basically 
trade with the country itself and form the bilateral coefficients and measure trade volume 
accordingly. However, own trade may entail effects not captured in bilateral trade models. For 
this purpose, we calculate own-use fixed effects as an adjustment to the price for domestic use 
such that for each producer country, the volume of internal trade derived from the model 
becomes equal to the actual use in the base period.  
The second challenge is to deal with the missing values, especially fixed effect data are 
missing for some countries. In particular, we do not obtain importer fixed effects if a country 
does not import from any other country. Since it is theoretically possible that these countries may 
start importing from other countries under some scenarios, we need their importer fixed effects 
for the simulation exercise. We address this problem by regressing the available fixed effects on 
country characteristics such as GDP, population, and GCE exports and use the results to predict 
fixed effects for the cases with missing data. The total number of such cases is less than 10 
percent of importer and exporters, the most important ones being transition countries that export 
GCE forms, but have limited data for estimation, especially before 1995. Excluding such 
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countries from the simulation exercises does not change the main results. But, we decided to 
include them to ensure that the exercises are more comprehensive.  
Another aspect of missing data challenge is that production and uses do not balance for 
many countries because of their dealings with the countries left out of the simulation exercise. 
We address this problem by taking the shares of all such transactions as given. So, the 
equilibrium of the exercises is derived with the remaining shares of production and expenditure 
being balanced through price adjustments. 
The fourth challenge is modeling overall supply and demand elasticity for each country. 
We assume that the aggregate expenditure is a constant elasticity function of the aggregate price 
of imports and own energy in each country. We obtain long run elasticities of energy demand 
(excluding oil) from Gately and Huntington (2002) which equals -0.24 for OECD and -0.16 for 
non-OECD countries. We could not find supply elasticity estimates for GCE forms of energy. 
So, we decided to use a rough estimate based on the supply increase given the 53 percent real 
increase in the GCE price rise during 1997-2007.1 Given the average increase of about 30 percent 
in total supply, this implies an elasticity of about 0.6. We also simulate the model with lower 
elasticities (0.1 and 0.3) for short run and medium runs. We augment our estimates by using the 
estimate of the heterogeneity factors for each supplier, wjit, as a relative supply elasticity 
indicator. We scale these indicators such that in the base case, the weighted supply elasticity of 
world production of GCE equals 0.6 in the long run. The weights that we use are the shares of 
directed dyad exports in total world exports. We repeat the exercise by changing the scaling 
factor for the world supply elasticity of 0.1 and 0.3. 
The fifth challenge is to translate the simulated partnership probabilities into an actual 
trade/no-trade outcome. For this purpose, once we calculate the probabilities of trade between 
directed dyads from equation (2) given the dyad’s characteristics, we employ the following rule 
for determining the existence of trade, indicated by Tji, which equals 1 in case of trade in the 
directed dyad ji and equals 0 in the absence of trade. We first check whether Tji  is equal to 1 or 0 
originally in actual data. If initially Tji  = 1 and the updated probability of trade is greater than or 
equal to 0.5, then the updated Tji  is set to 1, otherwise Tji  = 0 if the probability of trade drops by 
more than a tolerance level, t. When the initially Tji  = 0, we set the updated Tji  = 0 as long as the 
                                                 
1 The real price increase is based on 100 percent nominal increase less 30 percent CPI increase, or 2/1.3  1 = 0.53. 
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updated probability derived from the model is less than or equal to 0.5, otherwise we set the 
updated Tji  = 1 if the probability has risen by more than t. The role of t is to deal with 
unobserved factors that create partnerships or prevent a dyad from trading. A higher t means that 
trade partnerships do not form or fall apart with small changes in our measured probability of 
trade. Lower values of t discount the role of factors that may account for persistence in trade 
partnerships or lack thereof, but are not captured in our model. For our experiments, we set t = 
0.1, but our sensitivity analysis suggests that higher values of t do not change the results much. 
However, lower values of t do cause shifts in trade patterns, though still with limited impact on 
aggregate price changes. 
Our final challenge is to deal possible multiplicity or non-existence of equilibria. This is a 
problem in our model because in the absence of exports from country j to country i, the price in j 
may drop and the price in i may rise so much that makes trade between them profitable, while in 
the presence of trade prices become such that the trade probability equation negates such trade. 
Such fluctuations also affect aggregate prices and each country’s choices regarding their other 
partners, potentially giving rise to multiple equilibria and non-existence. Such situations are 
uncommon, but there are few dyads in some simulations that display such problems and prevent 
the convergence of our numerical solution algorithm. We address this concern by assuming that 
if, after for allowing for the tolerance level, a dyad finds it profitable to trade in the absence of 
initial trade, it will choose to trade even if profitability of trade may come into question once 
prices change as a result of trade.   
4.5.2 Energy Prices and Economic Growth 
Our first experiment with the model is to see if it can reproduce the growth of 
international energy prices during 1997-2007, when the average price of natural gas increased 
from $142 per barrel in 1997 to $321 in 2007, coal from $42 in 1997 to $68 in 2007, and 
electricity from $0.0648 in 1997 and $ 0.0879 in 2007 (IEA, 2010). The combined increase in 
price index amounts to an increase of 100 percent in ten years. We calculate the energy 
expenditure increase of each country by using its GDP growth rates given in World Development 
Indicators of World Bank and multiplying it by the income elasticities of energy use estimated 
by Gately and Huntington (2002). The first row of Table 4.4 shows the result of the simulation 
for three different levels of long run supply elasticities.  
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It is clear from the table that our estimate of the long run price elasticity of GCE supply 
give rise to average world prices for GCE that are somewhat lower than the world price rise of 
53 percent. To match the actual price rise, the average supply price elasticity must be about 0.4. 
However, the actual price increase also reflects the cross-price elasticity from the oil market that 
is not captured in this simulation. Assuming a long run cross-price elasticity of 0.02 (one fifth of 
the long run own price elasticity of oil), which raises GCE expenditures by about 3.8 percent 
over the 10 year period given the 190 percent real increase in oil prices, is adequate to reproduce 
the actual outcome. 
The rise in oil prices is often attributed to the increase in the demand from two fast 
growth giant economies, China and India. We explore this issue by recalculating the equilibrium 
lowering the growth rates of these two countries by half. The second row of Table 4.4 shows 
these results, which indicate that about 23 percent of the growth-induced rise in energy prices 
could be attributed to the fast growth of these two economies.  By way of comparison, we carry 
out two similar simulations, separately cutting the growth rates of OECD and transition countries 
in half.  The first experiment, reported in the third row of Table 4.4, shows that the fast growth in 
transition countries accounts only for 10.9 percent of price increase. The second experiment 
reported in the last row of Table 4.4 points to the fact that the growth in OECD countries may 
have been a more significant contributory factor, accounting for about 18.4 percent of the 
growth-induced GCE price rise between 1997 and 2007. 
4.5.3 The Impact of International Conflict: Confrontation between Russia and the West 
Beginning of 2009 Russia started cutting supply to Ukraine. As Ukraine is playing a key 
role in energy transit this was also seen as a signal from Russia to Europe that it can use energy 
as a weapon for political reasons. We use our model to examine the consequences of a possible 
embargo of Russia on Europe. We set the probability of trade between Russia and Europe to zero 
and recalculate the equilibrium. The world weighted average of buyer price goes up by 1.5 
percent, while the world weighted average of seller price does not change significantly. There is 
a 20 percent drop in the supplier price of Russia but increases in other supplier prices balance 
out. We summarize the impact of embargo on the trade relationship of Europe with other 
exporters in Table 4.5. Countries that rely on Russian exports increase their purchases from other 
sources up to 10 percent.  The price increase for individual countries has a wide range; for some 
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countries the increase in price is as low as half percent, for some countries price increases 
sharply, up to 9 percent. These figures suggest that the impact of such an embargo may be far 
greater on Russia than on Europe, casting some doubt on the credibility of Russian threats. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have estimated a model of bilateral trade of natural gas, coal, and 
electricity (GCE), controlling for the role of selection in partnership formation and source 
heterogeneity in the flow of oil among countries. The model displays a good fit and offers 
important insights into the working of the global GCE market. The results show that ignoring 
these controls introduces significant biases in the estimation of the elasticities of GCE trade with 
respect to its determinants.  
We use the model to carry out a series of global equilibrium simulation exercises to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the model. In particular, we show that the rise in GCE prices 
during 1997-2007 may be explained by economic growth around the world, with an estimated 
long-run price elasticity of world supply of GCE which is around 0.60. Moreover, high growth in 
China and India followed by rapid growth in transition countries and OECD countries account 
for the bulk of the rise in global GCE prices. We also show that the model can be used to explore 
various scenarios of GCE price responses to international conflict issues, especially the conflicts 
of Russia with Europe. 
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4.7 Tables 
Table 4.1 Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
Name Description Source 
Trade jit Logarithm of the sum of natural gas, coal and electricity 
exports from country j  to country i at time t in thousands 
of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Robert Feenstra, "“World Trade 
Flows (WTO), 1962–2000." 
www.internationaldata.org  
GCE 
Production jt 
Logarithm of the sum of natural gas, coal and electricity 
production in exporting country j  at time t in thousands 
of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) & 
International Energy Agency 
(IEA) 
GCE 
Expenditure it 
Logarithm of the sum of natural gas, coal and electricity 
expenditure in importing country i  at time t in thousands 
of constant 2000 US dollars. 
EIA, IEA and WTO 
Distanceji Logarithm of the great circle distance (in km) between 
exporter's j and importer's i capitals 
Centre D'Etudes Prospectives et 
D'Informations Internationales 
(CEPII)  
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgrap
h/cepii/cepii.htm 
Colonialji A binary variable that is unity if exporting country j ever 
colonized importing country i or vice versa. 
Land Borderji A binary variable that is unity if exporter j and importer i 
share a common land border 
Contiguityji Dichotomous indicator  that shows direct contiguity of 
exporter j and importer i  (1 = Land Border, 2 = 1-12 
miles water, 3 = 13-24, 4= 25-150 , 5 = 151-400, 6= not)  
Correlates of War Database 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
Islandji A binary variable that is unity if both exporter j and 
importer i are islands 
CIA The World Factbook  
Landlockedji A binary variable that is unity if both exporting country j 
and importing country i have no direct access to sea 
CIA The World Factbook 
 
Legalji A binary variable that is unity if the exporting country j 
and importing country i share the same legal origin. 
Easterly & Yu 
Languageji A binary variable that is unity if the exporting country j 
and importing country i uses a common language 
CIA The World Factbook 
Religionji (% Protestants in country j  % Protestants in country i)  
+ (% Catholics in country j  %Catholics in country i)  
+ (% Muslims in country j  %Muslims in country i) 
Encyclopedia Britannica Book 
of the Year 2001 
Ongoing 
Hostilityjit 
Dichotomous indicator of ongoing hostility between 
exporting country j and the importing country i . 
Correlates of War Database 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
Risk of 
Contract 
Repudiationjt 
A binary variable that takes the value one if contract 
repudiation in country j is less than the median score of 
all countries, zero otherwise. This variable is constructed 
separately for both exporting country j and the importing 
country i . If the score of a country is less than the median 
it has a higher risk for repudiation of contracts. 
Political Risk Services, Inc., 
ICGR Dataset 
GDPjt The logarithm of Gross Domestic Product in thousands of 
constant 2000 US dollars. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
www.worldbank.org/data  
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Table 4.2 Estimates of the GCE Trade Equations with Contract Repudiation as Excluded Variable†  
Pooled Panel of Directed Dyads with Instrumental Variables for Production and Expenditure, 1982-1997 
 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
‡ Marginal effects on probability of partnership at sample mean. 
+ 10% significance level, * 5% significance level, ** 1% significance level 
Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy, Tij Log of Exports of j to i, xji 
Model: Probit‡  Benchmark IVREG Polynomial IVREG
Log of GCE Production by Exporter, 
Lagged 
0.197** 0.585** 0.761** 
(0.040) (0.141) (0.169) 
Log of GCE Expenditure by Importer, 
Lagged 
0.114** 0.257+ 0.368* 
(0.040) (0.135) (0.154) 
Log of Distance -0.865** -0.870** -1.190** 
(0.025) (0.0640) (0.408) 
Border 0.287** 1.127** 0.992** 
(0.085) (0.176) (0.216) 
Island 0.117 -0.820* -0.543+ 
(0.131) (0.335) (0.326) 
Landlocked 0.912** 0.565 1.021+ 
(0.228) (0.504) (0.618) 
Legal 0.251** 0.0323 0.130 
(0.039) (0.100) (0.150) 
Language 0.019 -0.137 -0.116 
(0.058) (0.138) (0.133) 
Colonial ties 0.370** 0.434* 0.609* 
(0.086) (0.186) (0.257) 
Religion -0.106 0.00415 -0.0941 
(0.079) (0.191) (0.194) 
Ongoing Hostility, Lagged -1.151** -2.487** -4.790+ 
(0.166) (0.939) (2.838) 
Exporter Risk of Contract Repudiation 0.023** 
(0.008) 
0.0191 
(0.0237) 
 
 
Importer Risk of Contract Repudiation 0.040** 
(0.009) 
-0.00256 
(0.0254)  
*ˆ
ij    2.015
** 
  (0.476) 
*ˆ
ijz  
  3.053** 
  (0.622) 
2*ˆ
ijz    -0.547
** 
  (0.103) 
Observations 181799 12019 12019 
R2 . 0.541 0.568 
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Table 4.3 Estimates of GCE Trade with Contract Repudiation as Excluded Variable, 1982-1997† 
Decomposition of Bias Effects  
 
† The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
+ 10% significance level 
* 5% significance level 
** 1% significance level 
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports of j to i, xji 
Model: Benchmark IVREG 
Polynomial 
IVREG 
Firm 
Heterogeneity  
IVREG 
Heckman 
Selection 
IVREG 
Log of GCE Production by Exporter, 
Lagged 
0.585** 0.761** 0.249* 0.972** 
(0.141) (0.169) (0.126) (0.126) 
Log of GCE Expenditure by Importer, 
Lagged 
0.257+ 0.368* 0.0385 0.506** 
(0.135) (0.154) (0.126) (0.130) 
Log of Distance -0.870** -1.190** -0.497** -1.891** 
(0.0640) (0.408) (0.117) (0.118) 
Border 1.127** 0.992** 0.425* 1.199** 
(0.176) (0.216) (0.175) (0.166) 
Island -0.820* -0.543+ -0.722* -0.525 
(0.335) (0.326) (0.318) (0.323) 
Landlocked 0.565 1.021+ -0.735 1.803** 
(0.504) (0.618) (0.462) (0.489) 
Legal 0.0323 0.130 -0.341** 0.342** 
(0.100) (0.150) (0.0976) (0.0980) 
Language -0.137 -0.116 -0.134 -0.174 
(0.138) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) 
Colonial ties 0.434* 0.609* -0.179 0.896** 
(0.186) (0.257) (0.179) (0.198) 
Religion 0.00415 -0.0941 -0.0886 0.124 
(0.191) (0.194) (0.187) (0.188) 
Ongoing Hostility, Lagged -2.487** -4.790+ 2.425 -7.832** 
(0.939) (2.838) (1.669) (2.339) 
Exporter Risk of Contract Repudiation 0.0191 
(0.0237)    
Importer Risk of Contract Repudiation -0.00256 
(0.0254)    
*ˆ
ij   2.015
**  2.181** 
 (0.476)  (0.192) 
*ˆ
ijz  
 3.053** 4.710**  
 (0.622) (0.536)  
2*ˆ
ijz   -0.547
**   
 (0.103)   
Observations 12019 12019 12019 12019 
R2 0.541 0.568 0.548 0.572 
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Table 4.4 Percent Change in World Weighted Average of Seller Price of GCE  
Induced by GDP Growth During 1997-2007† 
 Supply 
Elasticity=0.1†† 
Supply  
Elasticity=0.3 
Supply 
Elasticity=0.6 
Scenario 1: Actual GDP Growth 
 97.8 59.8 42.5 
Scenario 2: Halved Growth in India 
and China 69.8 43.2 30.3 
Scenario 3: Halved Growth in 
Transition Countries 84.1 51.9 36.5 
Scenario 4: Halved Growth in OECD 
Countries 75.1 47.9 33.6 
 
† GCE production in each country is used as a weight for the role of its supply price in the aggregate world price 
index. 
†† Long run supply elasticity of crude oil 
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Table 4.5 The Impact of Disruption of GCE Trade between Russia and Europe 
Countries  that are 
Embargoed by Russia 
Initial share of 
Russia 
Country they 
import from the 
most 
Initial percentage of 
purchases 
Posterior 
percentage of 
purchases 
Belgium 0.41 Netherlands 8.55 8.65 
Denmark 0.03 Germany 0.65 0.69 
France 0.26 Algeria 1.91 2.02 
Germany 0.19 Poland 1.50 1.61 
Greece 0.08 USA 0.16 0.18 
Ireland  0.07 UK 7.07 7.10 
Italy 0.14 France 0.69 0.71 
Netherlands 0.17 Belgium 1.98 1.99 
Portugal 0.15 US 2.29 2.44 
Spain 0.12 Algeria 2.77 2.81 
UK 0.07 US 1.10 1.20 
Austria 0.20 Germany 7.58 7.92 
Finland 11.74 Russia 11.74 0.00 
Iceland 0.00 US 1.87 1.89 
Norway 0.32 Poland 0.81 0.90 
Sweden 0.36 Norway 2.57 2.73 
Switzerland 0.07 France 2.37 2.38 
Gibraltar 0.00 South Africa 15.89 16.41 
Malta 0.00 Algeria 4.11 4.17 
Albania 0.25 Russia 0.25 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.87 Poland 2.14 2.94 
Belarus 0.70 Poland 0.85 0.86 
Czech Rep. 0.64 Poland 6.88 6.98 
Estonia 1.52 Russia 1.52 0.00 
Hungary 2.74 Poland 5.64 6.09 
Latvia 11.90 Russia 11.90 0.00 
Lithuania 3.60 Poland 6.63 9.10 
Moldova 21.24 Russia 21.24 0.00 
Poland 1.90 Russia 1.90 0.00 
Romania 4.75 Russia 4.75 0.00 
Slovakia 1.39 Poland 13.26 14.10 
Ukraine 6.00 Russia 6.00 0.00 
Bosnia Herzegovina 0.85 Russia 0.85 0.00 
Croatia 0.79 Slovenia 6.39 6.53 
Slovenia  0.53 Crotia 3.81 3.86 
Macedonia 28.27 Poland 41.25 51.71 
Yugoslavia 0.07 Poland 0.32 0.33 
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